and wealth of which he knew; on condition that if more than half a ton of gold were brought back from it he should have his liberty; if less, that he should remain a prisoner for life. The personal security would in this case probably have been thought sufficient. But there was another point upon which security was more indispensable, and in which all these proposals were equally defective. Security was required against breaches of the peace. And as one of the proposed provisions was that "the Spaniards were not to be attacked except themselves should begin the war," it appeared upon the face of the proposal that the place where the mine was to be sought was one where Spaniards were likely to be found. This, like the two former, was rejected; I suppose for this reason. It was necessary therefore to get rid of this provision: which was easily done by providing that there should be no Spaniards in the way; and a fourth proposal was made, soon after Salisbury's death, similar in other respects to the last-so similar indeed that it might have been taken for the same-but differing in two points: The mine was to be one which was not near to any Spanish settlement; and he was to conduct the expedition in person. This new proposal, being supported with the full weight of Winwood's authority, who was now Secretary of State, the King was persuaded to agree to. On the 19th of March 1615–6, Ralegh was allowed to leave the Tower (though still with a keeper) to make preparations, and on the 26th of August 1616, his commission was signed.

No mention was made in it of any particular mine. The enterprise was described as a voyage "unto the south parts of America, or elsewhere within America, possessed and inhabited by heathen and savage people; to the end to discover and find out some commodities and merchandises in those countries that be necessary and profitable for the subjects of these our kingdoms and dominions, whereof the inhabitants there make little or no use or estimation; whereupon also may ensue by trade and commerce some propagation of the Christian faith and reformed religion amongst those savage and idolatrous people." But though the design was not more exactly defined (probably because a definition of the place where the treasure was might have incited rivals to contend for it) it was well understood that the real object, or at least the real pretence, of the voyage was a particular gold mine, of the existence of which near the banks of the Orinoco Ralegh had certain knowledge, and of the ore of which he had seen and tested samples. The commission gave him all the powers necessary for a commander, and secured to him and his fellow adventurers full property in all they should bring home, with reservation of a fifth part for the Crown. By way of

security against failure of performance or abuse of commission, the tenure under which he held his life was thought enough; and when Gondomar objected to the voyage on the ground that the mine was a mere pretence, that Ralegh's real intention was some piratical attack on Spanish property on land or sea, for which the force he was to be trusted with-fourteen armed ships carrying a body of land soldiers-would give him ample means; answer was made that he durst not attempt anything of that kind, because it would be at the peril of his life. "That there might be no mistake," says Mr. Gardiner, "he was called on to give security that he would not hurt any subjects of the King of Spain, and was plainly given to understand that if these orders were transgressed he would pay the penalty with his head:" and though the authority which is given for this statement does not imply that the warning had been given to Ralegh himself, but only that Winwood had declared it to be the King's known and avowed intention, it can hardly be doubted that Ralegh understood the condition well enough;2 nor is there any reason to think that he would have shrunk from accepting it. We have seen what security he was himself ready to offer for the performance of his engagements, in case he were allowed to go in person. If he did but persuade a course contrary to his avowed design, the officers in charge were to" cast him into the sea." If he did not bring them to a mountain covered with gold and silver ore, they might "cut off his head." It is evident therefore that he was quite prepared to run any risk of that kind: any risk, I mean, which was involved in accepting the condition and making the engagement. It does not follow that he meant the penalty to be paid: and having so many ways of escaping beyond the King's reach, I dare say he thought it very unlikely that the day would ever come when it could be demanded. But it is important to know and to remember that this was really the understanding upon which he undertook the enterprise. His commission was large enough. It did not limit him to one gold mine; nor did it require him to bring back gold at all. If he did really know of such a mine as he said he knew of, in a land not occupied de facto by Spaniards, there would be nothing to prevent him from bringing back enough of the produce to establish the fact; and it would be for the government to decide whether a permanent

1 Gardiner, (P. of W. and Sp. M.) vol. i. p. 52.

2 That he understood that he was forbidden to invade Spanish territory we have his own admission in his own journal. "I answered him [the Governor of Lancerota] that . . . I had no purpose to invade any of the Spanish King's territories, having received from the King my master express commandment to the contrary." Discovery of Guinea (Schomburg's ed.) p. 180.

3 See above, p. 343, notes 2 and 3.

occupation should be attempted. But it at the same time left open to him the whole field of peaceful enterprise. Anything which the natives were willing to part with he was at liberty to bring back and take four-fifths of the value. There was nothing in it to prevent him from turning his voyage to purposes of trade, discovery, colonization, or propagation of the Christian faith. The one thing which was forbidden was intrusion upon ground occupied by a civilized nation. The parts in which he was to operate were to be parts "possessed and inhabited by heathen and savage people;" a limitation carefully repeated in every clause. It has been said indeed that this limitation was futile and left everything open to dispute; for what was "possession ?" how far did the rights of occupancy" extend? And it is true that in order to answer that question satisfactorily and completely for all cases, it would have been necessary to obtain the opinion and consent of all civilized nations. It is true also that a case might easily have occurred in the execution of this very commission which would have left room for a quarrel between England and Spain. If Ralegh had found a valuable mine in some region at a distance from all Spaniards, and if the Spaniards had claimed it as their property in virtue of some distant settlement of theirs on the same coast, it would have furnished occasion for a fair diplomatic dispute, which the two nations would have had to settle as other disputes between nations are settled. In such a case the government could have had no quarrel with Ralegh. But all cases are not of this disputable kind. Whatever difficulty there may be in deciding whether those which lie near the limit are within or without, there are some which lie so far within that they leave no room for dispute at all. A place, for instance, which cannot be conveniently reached or safely occupied without taking military possession of a town built and inhabited by people professing Christianity,-is it or is it not a place "possessed and inhabited by heathen and savage people"? There could be no difficulty in answering that question, at any rate. If Ralegh himself had been asked before he went out-and asked in a way which obliged him to give a serious answer-what he would do if when he came to the mine he found a Spanish settlement prepared to resist him, what answer could he have given? He must have said that he would endeavour to turn his voyage to some other account; to find a mine elsewhere, to explore some other coast, or trade with the natives for some other commodity. He could not have said that he would land in spite of the Spaniards; for that was the very thing which the terms of his commission distinctly excluded. And it is possible that some such questions were put to him before he went. We learn

incidentally from one of Bacon's apophthegms that soon after he became Lord Keeper (which would be shortly before Ralegh sailed,) he had a long conversation with him in Gray's Inn walks. We are not told what the subject was, but it must have been interesting, and was probably important, for it was then that he kept the Earl of Exeter so long waiting upstairs. And it may have been on that occasion that the passage occurred which was related to Sir Thomas Wilson long after by Ralegh himself.

6

"Before he went, having conference with some great Lords his friends,2 who told him that they doubted he would be prizing if he could do it handsomely, 'Yea,' saith he, 'if I can light right on the Plate fleet you will think I were mad if I should refuse it.' To whom they answering 'why then you will be a pirate,' 'Tush,' quoth he, my Lord, did you ever hear of any that was counted a pirate for taking millions? They are poor mychers that are called in question for piracy, that are not able to make their peace with that they get. If I can catch the fleet, I can give this man ten thousand and that man ten thousand, and 600 thousand to the King, and yet keep enough for myself and all my company.'

This of course must be supposed to have been spoken in jest,-a playful diversion of an inconvenient question. But the apprehension that some such alternative in case of failure did enter into his contemplation was serious, and was not confined to Bacon. It is plain that Chamberlain (whose intimacy with Winwood gives more than usual importance to his impression in this matter) had no faith in the sincerity of the enterprise. On the 29th of March, 1617-the day on which Ralegh sailed from Dover for Plymouth-after mentioning some obstructions interposed or apprehended, and that the Prince was no friend to the expedition, he adds "God knows there needs no such great working to overthrow the voyage; for aught I can understand, I fear he doth but go (as children are wont to begin their tales) to seek his fortune."4

The difficulties were however overcome, and on the 12th of June he set sail with his squadron from Plymouth. After a tedious voyage in which he lost several of his principal officers and many of his men by sickness, and nearly died himself, he anchored in the mouth of the Caliana on the 14th of November. There he rested for a few weeks, and then assembling his fleet at the "Triangle Islands proceeded to "embark his men in five ships for Orenoque; to wit

'See Literary and Professional Works, vol. ii. p. 168.

2 In the rough note taken down at the time, it is described as tion he and my Lord Chancellor had about taking the Plate fleet." 3 S. P. Dom. James I. vol. xcix. no. 77.

4 S. P. vol. xc. no. 146.

"the conversa

400 soldiers and sailors "-with victuals "for a month and somewhat more." Of his preparations and instructions for this expedition we have his own account, written after his return to England, but before he knew on which side he would be called on to defend himself: a circumstance which does not diminish its value. From these we learn the nature of the enterprise as he understood it when he reached the scene of action. It was easy when in England to say that there were no Spaniards anywhere near the mine; but before he ventured on a landing it was necessary to ascertain the fact. Accordingly, his first inquiry seems to have been as to the forces of the Spaniards on the Orinoco. The answer he received was that a great number of soldiers had been sent thither; and the first instruction he gave to the companies who were to go, was "to stay a day or two in the Shurinamo to get pilots "s &c., and "by the Indians of that place to understand the state of the Spaniards in Orienoque, and whether they had replanted or strengthened themselves upon the entrance or elsewhere."4

It is clear therefore upon his own showing that, if not at the mine, at least on the way to it, he apprehended encounters with Spaniards. But this might be only at the mouth of the river or on the coast. His care might be only to pass these by, on his way to a region where there were none but savages. And the plan which was first proposed seems to be in accordance with this view of the case. For the expedition consisting of six companies in five ships, Keymis, who was to be commander, proposed to go forward himself in a shallop with only one officer and six musketeers, and pass at once to the mine, leaving the rest below. But this, though the first, was not the final resolution. Whether it was given out at first only for appearance, or whether it was a design really intended by Keymis, which he would have been rash enough to execute, Ralegh took good care to countermand it before it was too late. After the enterprise had been resolved upon and the instructions given, he, "better bethinking himself and misliking Keymis's determination, gave him this order following."

"Whereas you were resolved, etc., I do not allow of that course, because you cannot land so secretly but that some of the Indians from the river's side may discover you, who giving knowledge of your passage to the Spaniards, you may be cut off before you recover your boats."

So there were Spaniards to be expected in the immediate neigh