We undertake, (at least, the Trinitarians of our country, with whom I am acquainted, undertake,) not at all to describe affirmatively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative description of underived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of self existence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, because we cannot affirmatively define it.

I may ask, moreover, What is the eternity of God? You answer by telling me, that there never was a time, when he did not exist, and never can be one, when he will not exist. True; but then, what was time, before the planetary system, which measures it, had an existence? And what will time be, when these heavens and this earth shall be blotted out? Besides, passing over this difficulty about time, you have only given a negative description of God's eternity; you deny certain things of him, and then aver that he is eternal. Yet because you cannot affirmatively describe eternity, you would not refuse to believe that God is eternal. Why then should I reject the belief of a distinction in the Godhead, because I cannot affirmatively define it?

I do not admit therefore, that we are exposed justly to be taxed with mysticism, and absurdity, when we aver that there is a distinction in the Godhead, which we are utterly unable to define. I am aware, indeed, that a writer some time since composed and published, in a periodical work then edited at Cambridge, a piece in which he laboured, with no small degree of acuteness, to show that no man can believe a proposition, the terms of which are unintelligible, or which he does not understand. His object in doing this, appears to have been, to fix upon a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, the charge of absurdity. But it seems to me, the whole argument of that piece is founded on a confusion of two things, which are in themselves very diverse; viz., terms which are unintelligible, and things which are undefinable. You believe in the fact, that the divine existence is without cause; you understand the fact that God exists uncaused, but you cannot define underived exis tence. I believe, on the authority of the Scriptures, that there is a real distinction in the Godhead; but I cannot de

fine it. Still, the proposition that there is a real distinction, is just as intelligible, as the one that God is self existent. A multitude of propositions, respecting diverse subjects, resemble these. We affirm, that gravitation brings a body thrown into the air, down to the earth. The fact is perfectly intelligible. The terms are perfectly understood, so far as they are the means of describing this fact. But then, what is gravitation? An affirmative definition cannot be given, which is not a mere exchange of synonymes. Nor can any comparison define it; for to what shall we liken it?

The mind of every man, who is accustomed to think, will supply him with a multitude of propositions of this nature; in all of which, the fact designed to be described is clear; the terms so far as they describe this fact are clear; but the subject of the proposition, that is the thing itself, or agent, concerning which the fact is asserted, is undefinable; and, excepting in regard to the fact in question, perhaps wholly unknown to us.

How easy now to perplex common minds, by calling a proposition unintelligible, the subject of which is undefinable. In confounding things so very different, consists, as I apprehend, the whole ingenuity of the piece in question; an ingenuity, which may excite the admiration of those who love the subtilties of dispute, but cannot contribute much to illuminate the path of theological science.

I have been thus particular, in my statement of this very difficult part of the subject, in order to prevent misapprehension. I certainly do not hold myself bound to vindicate any of the definitions of person, or of distinction in the Godhead, which I have seen; because I do not adopt them. I do not, and cannot understand them; and to a definition I cannot with propriety assent, (still less, undertake to defend it,) until I do understand what it signifies, It is truly matter of regret, that some great and good men, have carried their speculations on this subject to such a length, that they have bewildered themselves and their readers. I would always speak with respect and tenderness of such men. Still I have no hesitation in saying, that my mind is absolutely unable to elicit any distinct and certain ideas, from any of the definitions of person in the Godhead, which I

have ever examined. A few examples of attempts at definition or illustration, will vindicate the correctness of what I have just said.

Let me begin with Tertullian, who flourished about A. D. 200. In his book against Praxeas, before quoted, in page 26, he says; "This perversity, (viz. of Praxeas,) thinks itself to be in possession of pure truth, while it supposes that we are to believe in one God, not otherwise than if we make the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost the self same; as if all were not one, while all are of one, viz. by a unity of substance; and still, the mysterious economy which distributes unity into a Trinity is observed, marking out [distinguishing] Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. There are three, not in condition, but rank; not in essence, but form; not in power, but in kind; but of one substance, one condition, and one power; for there is one God, from whom all those ranks, and forms, and kinds by the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are reckoned."

A little farther on, he says; "Whatever, therefore, the substance of the word (Logos) is, I call him a PERSON, and pay him reverence; and acknowledging the Son, I maintain that he is second from the Father.

"The third is the Spirit from God and the Son, as the fruit from the stalk is the third from the root; a stream from the river [the third] from the fountain; the sharp point from a ray [the third] from the sun. So the Trinity proceeds, by interlinked and connected grades, from the Father." (c. 2.)

In Cap. 9, he says; "They (the Trinity) are not separate from each other, although the Father is said to be diverse from the Son, and the Spirit."

And again; "We are baptized into the persons (of the Trinity) severally, by the use of their several names."

It is proper to observe here, how plainly and definitely the words person and Trinity, are at this very early age, applied by Tertullian to the Godhead; which contradicts the confident affirmations of some writers, that these terms were an invention of later ages and of scholastic divinity. I may add, that the familiar and habitual use which Tertullian makes of these terms, proves that they were commonly understood, or at least used in the church, at a period

so early, and in reference to the very distinction in the Godhead, which is the subject of the present discussion.

The object, which Tertullian aims at, in predicating person of the Godhead, is, as has been already remarked, to oppose the sentiment of Praxeas, who denied that there existed any distinction in the divine nature. But to explain Tertullian's similitudes, designed to illustrate the nature of this distinction, and so frequently copied in after ages, is more than I shall undertake. Who does not see, that all similitudes drawn from created, limited, dependent beings or things, must be utterly inadequate to illustrate the mode in which an uncreated, infinite, and omnipresent Being exists? What is the attempt at explanation, but darkening counsel by words without knowledge? I believe, with Tertullian, in a threefold distinction of the Godhead; but I believe simply the fact of a Trinity, and do not venture to make any attempt at explanation.

The venerable Council of Nice, held A. D. 325, have made an attempt, similar to that of the Father just named, at definition or description. Their words are; "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, the maker of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father; God of God, light of light, very God of very God, begotten not made, of the same substance with the Father, by whom all things were made.”

This Council, like the great body of the ancient Fathers, believed in the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. This generation from all eternity, appears to have been the distinctive point of difference between the Son and the Father, (whom the ancient ecclesiastical writers often describe as anos, unbegotten,) on which they fixed their attention, and which they have plainly laboured, in their Creed, to describe or illustrate. As coeternal with the Father, they regarded the Son; of the same substance, they have asserted him to be. How then could he be begotten, or derived, if he were of the same substance, and of the same eternity? To hold fast both these ideas, they said, the Son was, "God of God; light of light; very God of very God; begotten, not made; of the same substance with the Father." They endeavoured to justify such expressions,

by saying, that the light of the Sun is coeval with it, and of the same substance; and by a multitude of similes of such a nature, drawn from created and material objects. How utterly incompetent all this must be, to effect the object intended, is easy of apprehension, when we once reflect, that the divine nature is selfexistent, independent, and immutable.

The true occasion, however, why the Nicene Fathers accumulated so many terms, in their Creed, must be found in their intention to oppose every form and species of Arianism, although they meant to strike, as has before been observed, at other opinions, which they disapproved. A slight consideration of the Nicene Creed might lead one perhaps to suppose, that undefinable, or objectionable terms of illustration had been, almost intentionally, accumulated in it. The history of the introduction of these terms, however, may be found in the manner in which the Arians disputed with the Nicene Fathers. "Being asked, whether they acknowledged the Son, as begotten of the Father? They assented; meaning that they acknowledged the derived existence of the Son from God, as well as that of all other beings. Did they acknowledge the Son, as God? together so. Did they acknowledge him, as the true God? Undoubtedly he must be the true God, who is constituted God. Was the Son of God a creature? By no means; (mean-ing, not a creature in the sense that other things were; these being mediately created by the Logos, but the Logos immediately by the Father.) But when the word ouoovoros was proposed, and it was decided that Christ was consubstantial with the Father, they never assented to this, as it excluded all hope of evasion." (Athan. Epis. ad Afric.) A sober inquirer may therefore find, perhaps, more reason to vindicate this term, (so much agitated in the Churches,) as used by the Nicene Fathers, than he might at first suspect.

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After all, I am unable to conceive of any definite meaning, in the phrase, eternal generation. Generation or pro-duction, like creation, necessarily implies in itself beginning; and of course contradicts the idea of absolute eternity. In so far as Christ is divine, consubstantial with the Father, he must, for ought that I can see, be necessarily regarded as›