And would it not have been strange indeed, had Jehovah set himself about the erection of a universe, without think. ing and choosing what sort of a universe it should be? Would it not derogate from the perfection of God to perform any action, without intending it, and without certainly calculating upon all the intermediate, and ultimate consequences of it? Indeed, we shall adhere to the doctrine of divine predestination and foreordination, so long as we retain our reason, and believe in a God. Mr. Wilson did well to anticipate our strenuous defence of these points. p. 250.

Some of the principal doctrines of Mr. W. concerning predestination are the following:-that some of God's decrees are eternal; that some of them are not eternal; that some of them are immutable; that some of them are mutable; that some of them are conditional, and others unconditional. Yet in all this maze he can "discover man's free agency in operation, and yet, the accomplishment of God's steadfast purposes taking place." p. 256. It was eternally and immutably decreed, he says, that Joseph should be taken to Egypt; but the conduct of his brethren in selling him was not decreed to be the means of it; and had his brethren conducted aright,

"The divine decree would not have been at all frustrated thereby.; for the decree was not that the patriarchs should sell Joseph, but, that he should be sold into Egypt. Had they not volunteered to effect this purpose, others stood ready to have accomplished it. The slave-dealing Ishmaelites, how readily would they have kidnapped this forlorn youth, had they but found him distressed, and straying in the wilderness; or if some feeling yet remained in the bosoms of these traders in human flesh, some other remorseless band of the Ishmaelite robbers of the desart, seizing him as their prey, might have sold him to this Caravan for the twenty silver pieces." p. 238.

Were the Supreme Being so unwise as to decree an end without knowing and fixing the means of its accomplishment, he might be much obliged to Mr. Wilson for telling him how he might accomplish his purposes. We should like to know of our author, what but a divine foreordination could have rendered it certain to the Divine Mind, when he decreed that Joseph should be sold into

Egypt, that Joseph would wander in the wilderness, that any slave-dealing Ishmaelites would have met him, that a caravan would have been passing at the time of his being kidnapped; or that any band of robbers should exist to seize the forlorn youth. If neither the conduct of the patriarchs, nor of these said Ishmaelites was foreordained, the Lord might have been under the necessity of seeking other instruments for the accomplishment of the thing fixed in his purposes; and unless he had decreed that these other instruments should exist, we humbly conceive, that they might not have existed; and so the Deity would have been disappointed in executing one of his eternal and immutable counsels.

In like manner, Mr. W. thinks that, according to the foreknowledge and determinate counsel of God, Christ was to be betrayed, and crucified. It was eternally and immutably fixed that the person who should betray Christ should be an apostle; but it was not decreed that any one in particular should be that apostle, or that Judas should sell Christ, until Judas was born, and had become so incurably wicked, that it was an act of punitive justice in God, to elect him to the office of an apostle, that he might perform the part of a traitor, a reprobate, and a devil, among the twelve.

"Kings and rulers are implicated, but kings and rulers there were many. The people, and the Gentiles, are mentioned, but all the people of Israel, and all the Gentiles are not meant. The traitor was to be in office,' and to eat familiarly of Christ's bread, at his table: but he was to be yet chosen to that office. The unalterable decree is gone forth, but the lot is not yet fallen to any one of the actors. Before it can justly fall identically to any individual, kings, rulers, people, Gentiles, and an individual, must each render himself worthy of such an allotment. This worthiness must personally be acquired, whilst in the possession of a self determining power over their own wills, and be effected by a free and obstinate abuse of reason, a perversion of conscience, a corruption of natural affections, a rejection of the gospel, and a resistance of the strivings of the holy spirit; and such persons were those prodigies in depravity, unto whom God, in his holy providence, assigned irrevocably the several parts which they finally performed. Judas, as we have already seen, was, at his elevation to the apostolic office, incurably corrupt, for he was a devil. He

was not, however, always such, but like all other men, was once a candidate for salvation, and eternal life.

"For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together; for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel, determined before to be done.' The things to be done, and the rank and stations of the performers, are predetermined, but not the individual persons. Just like Joseph's being sold into Egypt, that was determined on, but by whom left for volunteer candidates to decide. Christ must be betrayed by an apostle. But the choice of that apostle, who shall perform the foul deed, cannot be made, until a candidate has rendered himself worthy of that disgrace, through an avoidable, voluntary, and base corruption of himself. Christ is to be delivered unto the Gentiles, to be mocked, spitefully entreated, spitted upon, scourged and crucified.' But these things cannot be done, until fit instruments, self qualified, offer their personal services."

"Scriptural predestination, so far as it involves human agency, and as it is here admitted and maintained, consists of two distinct kinds. First. It implies such a subjection of human volition and action to divine control, as in reality makes them, as to cause and effect, the actions of God; as where the king's heart, in the hand of God, is turned, as the rivers of water are turned.' For rivers of water are invariably turned by a natural, and not by a moral influence. And to these we may add such predicted actions of Cyrus and Josiah, as left neither of them any possibility of refraining from the performance of these things. And secondly. It comprehends all such events, as the holy scriptures have predicted shall inevitably come to pass; but yet, not allotted unavoidably to any particular individual actors; but suspended in reserve, as punishments, to be justly inflicted on such future great transgressors, as shall so corrupt themselves, in despite of the strivings of the divine spirit, as to rush with greediness on the perpetration of those actions, when Divine Providence may judicially afford them the awful opportunity."

"Predestination, as thus taught in the holy scriptures, is a doctrine differing widely from predestination, as taught by Calvinism and Calvinism improved. Scriptural predestination embraces some things only, but the predestination of the two Calvinisms comprehends all things whatsoever.

"Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Acts ii. 23. Here, it

VOL. II.

C

No. 1.

seems, is one point, eternally and immutably ordained; but, in the opinion of Mr. W. the means of Christ's being taken, the persons that should take him, and the hands that should crucify him, were not objects of an eternal foreordination. Had he attempted to deduce this doctrine from a criticism on Acts iv. 27, 28, we should not have been surprised; for we admit, that, using the nominative case in its proper place, we read, " For of a truth, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Issrael, were gathered together against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." But, granting Mr. Wilson's scheme every advantage which can, with any degree of plausibility, be taken in its favour, we are astonished that any man of intelligence can advocate it. We shall not weary ourselves and our readers by following our theologian step by step, but shall confirm the statements already made by a few remarks.

The scriptural assertion, "that the king's heart, in the hand of God, is turned, as the rivers of water are turned," in our apprehension, implies nothing more than the fact, that as certainly and truly as God governs the rivers of water according to the laws of fluids, so certainly and truly he governs the king's heart, according to the laws of mental operation. And since the king's heart, or soul, (for heart here seems to denote the whole human soul, spirit, or mind,) is constituted like every other man's soul, we infer that God completely governs every mind, in all its operations, in a way perfectly consistent with free, accountable agency. There is no proof, that, in any case, as God physically turns the rivers of water, so he physically turns a human soul in its operations. The actions of Cyrus and Josiah were as free as those of Judas and Joseph's brethren.

In relation to the supposed predestination of an event, the means of accomplishing which are to be predestinated at some subsequent time, when certain instruments have rendered themselves meritorious of being used in some baneful agency; we would ask, When Jehovah decreed the death of the Redeemer, did he know that Judas would betray him, and Pontius Pilate deliver him up to be cru

cified? If he did not know it, he did not, at the time of fixing the event, know the means of its accomplishment. If he did not know them, he did not choose them, for intelligent beings cannot choose any means of accomplishing any thing, without first having some knowledge of the means. They must be conceived of, betore they can be chosen. Now, if the very means of the Redeemer's being betrayed and delivered into the hands of them that crucified him, were not chosen by God, he acted without wisdom; for wisdom consists in selecting the best means for accomplishing any predestinated end; and God, according to the theory of Mr. W. was so far from selecting the best means, that he did not choose any. He designed an end, when he was, at the time, ignorant of the means by which that end was to be obtained. Of course, Mr. Wilson's theory cannot be correct, because it would prove Jehovah destitute of wisdom.

Again, if Jehovah knew the part which Judas, Herod, and Pilate would act in the scene of Christ's death, before they were born, it must have been certain to his mind, that they, and no other persons, would act the very part which they did. If it was certain, something must have caused it to be certain, or else the certainty must have existed without any cause; but there is no effect without a cause; therefore something must have caused it to be certain to the Divine mind, that Judas, Herod, and Pilate, would act the part they did, in relation to our Saviour's death. If we proceed to enquire what this something is, which rendered the agency of these persons in the death of Christ certain, before they were born, we shall be obliged to decide that it was neither their thoughts, nor purposes, nor wills, nor mind, nor impiety, for these had no existence at the time of its being certain in the divine foreknowledge; and that which has no existence cannot be the cause of any effect. Pursuing this train of thought, we shall find that when God foreknew what Judas and others would do, there was no being in existence but himself; and that it must have been something in himself that rendered their agency, as well as their existence certain.

The foreknowledge of God being denied, every one may see that all the other divine attributes may be dis