Of MERIT and DEMERIT; or, of the Objects of REWARD and PUNISHMENT.

CONSISTING OF THREE SECTIONS.

SECTION I.

Of the sense of merit and demerit.

INTRODUCTION.

THERE is another fet of qualities afcribed to

the actions and conduct of mankind, distinct from their propriety or impropriety, their decency or ungracefulness, and which are the objects of a diftinct fpecies of approbation and disapprobation. These are merit and demerit, the qualities of deferving reward, and of deferving punishment.

It has already been observed, that the fentiment or affection of the heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue or vice depends, may be confidered under two different afpects, or in two different relations: first, in relation to the caufe or object which excites it; and, fecondly, in relation to the end which it proposes,

or to the effect which it tends to produce: that upon the suitableness or unfuitablenefs, upon the proportion or difproportion, which the affection feems to bear to the caufe or object which excites it, depends the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the confequent action; and that upon the beneficial or hurtful effects which the affection proposes or tends to produce, depends the merit or demerit, the good or ill defert of the action to which it gives occafion. Wherein confifts our fenfe of the propriety or impropriety of actions, has been explained in the former part of this difcourfe. We come now to confider, wherein confifts that of their good or ill defert.

CHAP. I.

That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward, and that, in the fame manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of reJentment, appears to deferve punishment.

To us, therefore, that action must appear to de

ferve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of that fentiment, which moft immediately and directly prompts us to reward, or to do good to another. And in the fame manner, that action muft appear to deferve punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of that fentiment which moft immediately and directly prompts us to publifh, or inflict evil upon another.

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The fentiment which moft immediately and directly prompts us to reward, is gratitude; that which most immediately and directly prompts us to punish, is refentment.

To us, therefore, that action muft appear to deferve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude; as, on the other hand, that action muft appear to deserve punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of refentment.

To reward, is to recompenfe, to remunerate, to return good for good received. To punish, too, is to recompenfe, to remunerate, though in a different manner; it is to return evil for evil that has been done.

There are some other paffions, befides gratitude and resentment, which interest us in the happiness or mifery of others; but there are none which fo directly excite us to be the inftruments of either. The love and efteem which grow upon acquaintance and habitual approbation, neceffarily lead us to be pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the object of fuch agreeable emotions, and confequently, to be willing to lend a hand to promote it. Our love, however, is fully fatisfied, though his good fortune fhould be brought about without our affiftance. All that this paffion defires is to fee him happy, without regarding who was the author of his profperity. But gratitude is not to be fatisfied in this manner. If the person to whom we owe many obligations, is made happy without our affiftance, though it pleases our love, it does not content our gratitude. Till we H 2

have

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have recompenfed him, till we ourselves have been inftrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourselves ftill loaded with that debt which his past fervices have laid upon us..

The hatred and diflike, in the fame manner, which grow upon habitual disapprobation, would often lead us to take a malicious pleasure in the misfortune of the man whofe conduct and character excite fo painful a paffion. But though diflike and hatred harden us against all fympathy, and fometimes difpofe us even to rejoice at the diftrefs of another, yet, if there is no refentment in the cafe, if neither we nor our friends have received any great perfonal provocation, these paffions would not naturally lead us to wish to be inftrumental in bringing it about. Tho' we could fear no punishment in confequence of our having had some hand it, we would rather that it should happen by other means. To one under the dominion of violent hatred it would be agreeable, perhaps, to hear, that the perfon whom he abhorred and detefted was killed by fome accident. But if he had the least spark of juftice, which, though this paffion is not very favourable to virtue, he might still have, it would hurt him exceffively to have been himself, even without defign, the occafion of this misfortune. Much more would the very thought of voluntarily contributing to it shock him beyond all measure. He would reject with horror even the imagination of fo execrable a defign; and if he could imagine himself capable of fuch an enormity, he would begin to regard himself in the fame odious light in which he had confidered the person who was the object of his diflike. But it is quite otherwife with refentment:

if

if the person who had done us fome great injury, who had murdered our father or our brother, for example, should foon afterwards die of a fever, or even be brought to the scaffold upon account of some other crime, though it might footh our hatred, it would not fully gratify our refentment. Refentment would prompt us to defire, not only that he should be punished, but that he should be punished by our means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us. Refentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have fuffered from him. He must be made to repent and be forry for this very action, that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. The natural gratification of this paffion tends, of its own accord, to produce all the political ends of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and the example to the public.

Gratitude and refentment, therefore, are the fentiments which moft immediately and directly prompt to reward and to punish. To us, therefore, he must appear to deserve reward, who appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to deferve punishment, who appears to be that of refentment.