When music imitates the modulations of grief or joy, it either actually infpires us with those paffions, or at least puts us in the mood which difpofes us to conceive them. But when it imitates the notes of anger, it infpires us with fear. Joy, grief, love, admiration, devotion, are all of them paffions which are naturally mufical. Their natural tones are all foft, clear, and melodious; and they naturally exprefs themselves in periods which are distinguished by regular paufes, and which upon that account are eafily adapted to the regular returns of the correfpondent airs of a tune. The voice of anger, on the contrary, and of all the paffions which are akin to it, is harsh and difcordant. It periods too are all irregular, fometimes very long, and fometimes very short, and diftinguished by no regular pauses. It is with difficulty, therefore, that mufic can imitate any of those paffions; and the music which does imitate them is not the moft agreeable. A whole entertainment may confift, without any impropriety, of the imitation of the focial and agreeable paffions. It would be a strange entertainment which confifted altogether of the imitations of hatred and refent

ment.

If those paffions are disagreeable to the spectator, they are not lefs fo to the perfon who feels them. Hatred and anger are the greatest poison to the happiness of a good mind. There is, in the very feeling of those paffions, fomething harsh, jarring, and convulfive, fomething that tears and distracts the breast, and is altogether deftructive of that compofure and tranquillity of mind which is fo neceffary to happiness, and which is beft promoted by the

contrary

contrary paffions of gratitude and love. It is not the value of what they lofe by the perfidy and ingratitude of thofe they live with, which the generous and humane are moft apt to regret. Whatever they may have loft, they can generally be very happy without it. What moft difturbs them is the idea of perfidy and ingratitude exercised towards themselves; and the difcordant and disagreeable paffions which this excites, conftitutes, in their own opinion, the chief part of the injury which they fuffer.

How many things are requifite to render the gratification of refentment compleatly agreeable, and to make the fpectator thoroughly fympathize with our revenge? The provocation must first of all be fuch that we should become contemptible, and be exposed to perpetual infults, if we did not, in fome measure, refent it. Smaller offences are always better neglected; nor is there any thing more despicable than that froward and captious humour which takes fire upon every flight occafion of quarrel. We should refent more from a fenfe of the propriety of refentment, from a fenfe that mankind expect and require it of us, than because we feel in ourselves the furies of that difagreeable paffion. There is no paffion, of which the human mind is capable, concerning whofe juftnefs we ought to be fo doubtful, concerning whofe indulgence we ought fo carefully to confult our natural sense of propriety, or fo diligently to confider what will be the fentiments of the impartial fpectator. Magnanimity, or a regard to maintain our own rank and dignity in fociety, is the only motive which can ennoble the expreffions of this difagreeable paffion. This mo

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*tive

tive must characterize our whole ftile and deportment. These must be plain, open, and direct; determined without pofitiveness, and elevated without infolence; not only free from petulance and low fcurrility, but generous, candid, and full of all proper regards, even for the person who has offended us. It muft appear, in fhort, from our whole manner, without our labouring affectedly to exprefs it, that paffion has not extinguifhed our humanity; and that if we yield to the dictates of revenge, it is with reluctance, from neceffity, and in confequence of great and repeated provocations. When refentment is guarded and qualified in this manner, it may be admitted to be even generous and noble.

CHA P. IV.

Of the focial paffions.

As it is a divided fympathy which renders the

S whole fet of paffions juft now mentioned, upon moft occafions, fo ungraceful and difagreeable; fo there is another fet oppofite to thefe, which a redoubled fympathy renders almost always peculiarly agreeable and becoming. Generofity, humanity, kindness, compaffion, mutual friendship and esteem, all the focial and benevolent affections, when expreffed in the countenance or behaviour, even to

wards

wards those who are peculiarly connected with ourfelves, please the indifferent spectator upon almost every occafion. His fympathy with the person who feels those paffions, exactly coincides with his concern for the perfon who is the object of them. The intereft, which, as a man, he is obliged to take in the happiness of this last, enlivens his fellow-feeling with the fentiments of the other, whofe emotions are employed about the fame object. We have always, therefore, the strongest difpofition to sympathize with the benevolent affections. They appear in every respect agreeable to us. We enter into the fatisfaction both of the person who feels them, and of the person who is the object of them. For as to to be the object of hatred and indignation gives more pain than all the evils which a brave man can fear from his enemies; fo there is a fatisfaction in the consciousness of being beloved, which, to a person of delicacy and fenfibility, is of more importance to happiness than all the advantage which he can expect to derive from it. What character is so detestable as that of one who takes pleasure to fow diffenfion among friends, and to turn their most tender love into mortal hatred? Yet wherein does the atrocity of this fo much abhorred injury confift? Is it in depriving them of the frivolous good offices, which had their friendship continued, they might have expected from one another? It is in depriving them of that friendship itself, in robbing them of each others affections, from which both derived fo much fatisfaction; it is in difturbing the harmony of their hearts, and putting an end to that happy commerce which had before fubfifted between them. Thefe affections, that harmony, this commerce, are felt, not only by the tender and the delicate, but by

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the

the rudeft vulgar of mankind, to be of more importance to happiness than all the little fervices which could be expected to flow from them.

The fentiment of love is, in itself, agreeable to the person who feels it. It fooths and compofes the breast, seems to favour the vital motions, and to promote the healthful ftate of the human conftitution; and it is rendered ftill more delightful by the consciousness of the gratitude and fatisfaction which it must excite in him who is the object of it. Their mutual regard renders them happy in one another, and sympathy, with this mutual regard, makes them agreeable to every other perfon. With what pleafure do we look upon a family, through the whole of which reign mutual love and efteem, where the parents and children are companions for one another, without any other difference than what is made by respectful affection on the one fide, and kind indulgence on the other; where freedom and fondness, mutual raillery, and mutual kindness, fhow that no oppofition of intereft divides the brothers, nor any rivalship of favour fets the fifters at variance, and where every thing presents us with the idea of peace, chearfulness, harmony, and contentment? On the contrary, how uneafy are we made when we go into a house in which jarring contention fets one half of those who dwell in it against the other; where amidft affected fmoothnefs and complaifance, fufpicious looks and fudden ftarts of paffion betray the mutual jealoufies which burn within them, and which are every moment ready to burst out through all the restraints which the prefence of the company impofes?

Thofe