unmanly and unbecoming. There is, however, a good deal of fympathy even with bodily pain. If, as has already been observed, I see a stroke aimed, and juft ready to fall upon the leg or arm, of another perfon, I naturally fhrink and draw back my own leg, or my own arm; and when it does fall, I feel it in fome measure, and am hurt by it as well as the fufferer. My hurt, however, is, no doubt, exceffively flight, and, upon that account, if he makes any violent out-cry, as I cannot go along with him, I never fail to despise him. And this is the cafe of all the paflions which take their origin from the body: they excite either no fympathy at all, or fuch a degree of it, as is altogether difproportioned to the violence of what is felt by the fufferer, It is quite otherwife with those paffions which take their origin from the imagination. The frame of my body can be but little affected by the alterations which are brought about upon that of my companion but my imagination is more ductile, and more readily affumes, if I may fo, the fhape and configuration of the imaginations of thofe with whom I am familiar. A disappointment in love, or ambition, will, upon this account, call forth more fympathy than the greatest bodily evil. Those paffions arise altogether from the imagination. The person who has loft his whole fortune, if he is in health, feels nothing in his body. What he fuffers is from the imagination only, which represents to him the lofs of his dignity, neglect from his friends, contempt from his enemies, dependence, want, and mifery, coming faft upon him; and we fympathize with him more strongly upon this account, becaufe our imaginations can more readily mould themfelves D 3 upon upon his imagination, than our bodies can mould themselves upon his body. The lofs of a leg may generally be regarded as a more real calamity than the lofs of a miftrefs. It would be a ridiculous tragedy, however, of which the catastrophe was to turn upon a lofs of that kind. A misfortune of the other kind, how frivolous foever it may appear to be, has given occafion to many a fine one. Nothing is fo foon forgot as pain. The moment it is gone the whole agony of it is over, and the thought of it can no longer give us any fort of difturbance. We ourfelves cannot then enter into the anxiety and anguish which we had before conceived. An unguarded word from a friend will occafion a more durable uneafinefs. The agony which this creates is by no means over with the word. What at first disturbs us is not the object of the fenfes, but the idea of the imagination. As it is an idea, therefore, which occafions our uneafinefs, till time and other accidents have in fome measure effaced it from our memory, the imagination continues to fret and rankle within, from the thought of it. Pain never calls forth any very lively fympathy unless it is accompanied with danger. We fympathize with the fear, though not with the agony of the fufferer. Fear, however, is a paflion derived altogether from the imagination, which reprefents, with an uncertainty and fluctuation that increases our anxiety, not what we really feel, but what we may, hereafter poffibly fuffer. The gout or the tooth-ach, though exquifitely painful, excite very little little fympathy; more dangerous difeafes, though accompanied with very little pain, excite the higheft. Some people faint and grow fick at the fight of a chirurgical operation, and that bodily pain which is occafioned by tearing the flesh, seems, in them, to excite the moft exceffive fympathy. We conceive in a much more lively and diftinct manner, the pain which proceeds from an external caufe, than we do that which arifes from an internal diforder. I can fearce form an idea of the agonies of my neighbour when he is tortured with the gout, or the ftone; but I have the clearest conception of what he muft fuffer from an incifion, a wound, or a fracture. The chief caufe, however, why fuch objects produce fuch violent effects upon us, is their novelty. One who has been witnefs to a dozen diffections, and as many amputations, fees, ever after, all operations of this kind with great indifference, and often with perfect infenfibility. Though we have read or feen reprefented more than five hundred tragedies, we fhall feldom feel fo entire an abatement of our fenfibility to the object which they reprefent --to us. In fome of the Greek tragedies there is an attempt to excite compaflion, by the representation, of the agonies of bodily pain. Philoctetes cries out and faints from the extremity of his fufferings. Hippolytus and Hercules are both introduced as expiring under the fevereft tortures, which, it seems, even the fortitude of Hercules, was incapable of fupporting. In all thefe cafes, however, it is not the pain which interests us, but fome other circumstance. ·D 4 It is not the fore foot, but the folitude, of Philoctetes which affects us, and diffufes over that charming tragedy, that romantic wildness, which is fo agreeable to the imagination. The agonies of Hercules and Hippolytus are interested only because we foresee that death is to be the confequence. If those heroes were to recover, we should think the representation of their fufferings perfectly ridiculous. What a tragedy would that be of which the distress confifted in a colic. Yet no pain is more exquifite. These attempts to excite compaffion by the reprefentation of bodily pain, may be regarded as among the greatest breaches of decorum of which the Greek theatre has fet the example. The little fympathy which we feel with bodily pain is the foundation of the propriety of conftancy and patience in enduring it. The man, who under the fevereft tortures allows no weakness to escape him, vents no groan, gives way to no paffion which we do not entirely enter into, commands our higheft admiration. His firmness enables him to keep time with our indifference and infenfibility. We admire and entirely go along with the magnanimous effort which he makes for this purpose. We approve of his behaviour, and from our experience of the common weakness of human nature, we are furprifed, and wonder how he should be able to act fo as to deferve approbation. Approbation, mixed and animated by wonder and furprise, conftitutes the fentiment which is properly called admiration, of which, applaufe is the natural expreffion, as has already been observed. CHAP. CHA P. II. Of thofe paffions which take their origin from a particular turn or babit of the imagination. EVEN VEN of the paffions derived from the imagination, those which take their origin from a peculiar turn or habit it has acquired, though they may be acknowledged to be perfectly natural, are, however, but little fympathized with. The imaginations of mankind, not having acquired that particular turn, cannot enter into them; and fuch paffions, though they may be allowed to be almoft unavoidable in fome part of life, are always in fome measure ridiculous. This is the cafe with that strong attachment which naturally grows up between two perfons of different fexes, who have long fixed their thoughts upon one another, Our imagination not having run in the fame channel with that of the lover, we cannot enter into the eagerness of his emotions. If our friend has been injured, we readily fympathize with his refentment, and grow angry with the very person with whom he is angry. If he has received a benefit, we readily enter into his gratitude, and have a very high sense of the merit of his benefactor. But if he is in love, though we may think his paffion juft as reasonable as any of the kind, yet we never think ourselves bound to conceive a passion of the fame kind, and for the fame perfon for whom he has conceived it. The paffion appears to eve-. ry body, but the man who feels it, entirely difpro portioned |