gence of those paffions, it is certain that luxury, fenfuality, and oftentation are public benefits: fince, without the qualities upon which he thinks proper to bestow fuch opprobrious names, the arts of refinement could never find encouragement, and must languish for want of employment. Some popular afcetic doctrines which had been current before his time, and which placed virtue in the entire extirpation and annihilation of all our paffions, were the real foundation of this licentious fyftem. It was easy for Dr. Mandeville to prove, firft, that this entire conquest never actually took place among men; and fecondly, that, if it was to take place universally, it would be pernicious to fociety, by putting an end to all industry and commerce, and in a manner to the whole business of human life. By the firft of these propofitions he seemed to prove that there was no real virtue, and that what pretended to be fuch, was a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and by the fecond, that private vices were public benefits, fince without them no fociety could profper or flourish.

Such is the system of Dr. Mandeville, which once made fo much noife in the world, and which, though perhaps, it never gave occafion to more vice than what would have been without it, at least taught that vice, which arose from other caufes, to appear with more effrontery, and to avow the corruption of its motives with a profligate audacioufnefs which had never been heard of before.

But how destructive foever this fyftem may appear, it could never have impofed upon fo great a number of perfons, nor have occafioned fo general an alarm

among

among those who are the friends of better principles, had it not in some respects bordered upon the truth, A system of natural philofophy may appear very plaufible, and be for a long time very generally received in the world, and yet have no foundation in nature, nor any sort of resemblance to the truth. The vortices of Des Cartes were regarded by a very ingenious nation, for near a century together, as a moft fatisfactory account of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Yet it has been demonftrated, to the conviction of all mankind, that these pretended causes of those wonderful effects, not only do not actually exist, but are utterly impoffible, and if they did exift, could produce no fuch effects as are afcribed to them. But it is otherwife with fyftems of moral philosophy, and an author who pretends to account for the origin of our moral fentiments, cannot deceive us fo grofsly, nor depart fo very far from all resemblance to the truth. When a traveller gives an account of fome diftant country, he may impofe upon our credulity the moft groundless and abfurd fictions as the most certain matters of fact. But when a perfon pretends to inform us of what paffes in our neighbourhood, and of the affairs of the very parish which we live in, though here too, if we are fo careless as not to examine things with our own eyes, he may deceive us in many refpects, yet the greatest falfehoods which he imposes upon us must bear fome refemblance to the truth, and must even have a confiderable mixture of truth in them. An author who treats of natural philofophy, and pretends to affign the causes of the great phænomena of the universe, pretends to give an account of the affairs of a very distant country, concerning which he may tell us what he pleases, and as long as his narration keeps within the bounds of feeming poffibility, he need not despair

Z 4

defpair of gaining our belief. But when he propofes to explain the origin of our defires and affections, of our fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, he pretends to give an account, not only of the affairs of the very parish that we live in, but of our own domeftic concerns. Though here too, like indolent masters who put their truft in a steward who deceives them, we are very liable to be impofed upon, yet we are incapable of paffing any account which does not preferve fome little regard to the truth. Some of the articles, at least, must be juft, and even those which are most overcharged muft have had fome foundation, otherwise the fraud would be detected even by that careless inspection which we are difpofed to give. The author who fhould affign, as the caufe of any natural fentiment, fome principle which neither had any connexion with it, nor resembled any other principle which had fome fuch connexion, would appear abfurd and ridiculous to the most injudicious and unexperienced reader.

SECT

SECTION III.

Of the different fyftems which have been formed concerning the principle of approbation.

INTRODUCTIO N.

AFTER

FTER the inquiry concerning the nature of virtue, the next queftion of importance in Moral Philofophy, is concerning the principle of approba. tion, concerning the power or faculty of the mind which renders certain characters agreeable or difagreeable to us, makes us prefer one tenour of conduct to another, denominate the one right and the other wrong, and confider the one as the object of approbation, honour, and reward; the other as that of blame, cenfure, and punishment.

Three different accounts have been given of this principle of approbation. According to fome, we approve and difapprove both of our own actions and of those of others, from felf-love only, or from fome view of their tendency to our own happiness or difadvantage; according to others, reafon, the fame faculty by which we diftinguish between truth and falfehood, enables us to diftinguish between what is fit and unfit both in actions and affections: according to others this diftinction is altogether the effect of immediate fentiment and feeling, and arises from the fatisfaction or difguft with which the view of

certain

certain actions or affections infpires us. Self-love, reason, and sentiment, therefore, are the three different sources which have been affigned for the principle of approbation.

Before I proceed to give an account of those different fyftems, I must observe, that the determination of this fecond question, though of the greatest importance in fpeculation, is of none in practice. The question concerning the nature of virtue neceffarily has fome influence upon our notions of right and wrong in many particular cafes. That concerning the principle of approbation can poffibly have no fuch effect. To examine from what contrivance or mechanism within, those different notions or fentiments arise, is a mere matter of philofophical curiofity.

CHAP. I.

Of thofe fyftems which deduce the principle of approbation from felf-love.

THOSE

HOSE who account for the principle of approbation from felf-love, do not all account for it in the fame manner, and there is a good deal of confufion and inaccuracy in all their different fyltems. According to Mr. Hobbes, and many of his followers. man is driven to take refuge in fociety, not by any natural love which he bears to his own kind, but because without the affiftance of others he is incapable of fubfifting with ease or fafety. Society, upon

*

*Puffendorff. Mandeville.