of benevolence and love which influenced all the actions of the deity. The actions of men which flowed from this motive were alone truly praife-worthy, or could claim any merit in the fight of the deity. It was by actions of charity and love only that we could imitate, as became us, the conduct of God, that we could exprefs our humble and devout admiration of his infinite perfections, that by foftering in our own minds the fame divine principle, we could bring our own affections to a greater refemblance with his holy attributes, and thereby become more proper objects of his love and efteem; till at laft we arrived at that immediate converfe and communication with the deity to which it was the great object of this philofophy to raise us.

This fyftem, as it was much efteemed by many ancient fathers of the christian church, so after the reformation it was adopted by several divines of the moft eminent piety and learning, and of the most amiable manners; particularly, by Dr. Ralph Cudworth, by Dr. Henry More, and by Mr. John Smith of Cambridge. But of all the patrons of this fyftem, ancient or modern, the late Dr. Hutchefon, was undoubtedly beyond all comparifon, the most acute, the most distinct, the moft philofophical, and what is of the greatest confequence of all, the fobereft and most judicious.

That virtue confifts in benevolence is a notion fupported by many appearances in human nature. It has been obferved already that proper benevolence is the moft graceful and agreeable of all the affections, that it is recommended to us by a double fympathy, that as its tendency is neceffarily benefi

cent,

cent, it is the proper object of gratitude and reward, and that upon all thefe accounts it appears to our natural fentiments to poffefs a merit fuperior to any other. It has been obferved too that even the weakneffes of benevolence are not very difagreeable to us, whereas thofe of every other paffion are always extremely difgufting. Who does not abhor exceffive malice, exceffive felfifhnefs, or exceffive refentment? But the most exceffive indulgence even of partial friendship is not fo offenfive. It is the benevolent paffions only which can exert themfelves without any regard or attention to propriety, and yet retain. fomething about them which is engaging. There is fomething pleafing even in mere inftinctive goodwill which goes on to do good offices without once reflecting whether by this conduct it is the proper object either of blame or approbation. It is not fo with the other paffions. The moment they are deferted, the moment they are unaccompanied by the fense of propriety, they ceafe to be agreeable.

As benevolence beftows upon thofe actions which proceed from it, a beauty fuperior to all others, fo the want of it, and much more the contrary inclina→ tion, communicates a peculiar deformity to whatever evidences fuch a difpofition. Pernicious actions are often punishable for no other reason than because they fhow a want of fufficient attention to the happiness of our neighbour.

Befides all this, Dr. Hutchefon * observed, that whenever in any action, fuppofed to proceed from benevolent affections, fome other motive had been difcovered,

Y 2

* See Inquiry concerning virtue, fect. 1, and 2.

.

discovered, our sense of the merit of this action was juft fo far diminished as this motive was believed to have influenced it. If an action, fupposed to proceed from gratitude, should be difcovered to have arifen from an expectation of fome new favour, or if what was apprehended to proceed from public fpirit, fhould be found out to have taken its origin from the hope of a pecuniary reward, fuch a difcovery would entirely destroy all notion of merit or praife-worthiness in either of these actions. Since, therefore, the mixture of any felfish motive, like that of a base alloy, diminifhed or took away altogether the merit which would otherwise have belonged to any action, it was evident, he imagined, that virtue must consist in pure and difinterested benevolence alone.

1

When those actions, on the contrary, which are commonly fuppofed to proceed from a selfish motive, are difcovered to have arifen from a benevolent one, it greatly enhances our sense of their merit. If we believed of any person that he endeavoured to advance his fortune from no other view but that of doing friendly offices, and of making proper returns to his benefactors, we fhould only love and efteem him the more. And this observation feemed still more to confirm the conclufion, that it was benevolence only which could stamp upon any action the character of virtue.

Laft of all, what, he imagined, was an evident proof of the juftness of this account of virtue, in all the disputes of cafuifts concerning the rectitude of conduct, the public good, he obferved, was the standard to which they conftantly referred; thereby universally acknowledging that whatever tended to

promote

promote the happiness of mankind was right and laudable and virtuous, and the contrary, wrong, blameable, and vicious. In the late debates about paffive obedience and the right of refiftance, the fole point in controverfy among men of fenfe was, whether univerfal fubmiffion would probably be attended with greater evils than temporary infurrections when privileges were invaded. Whether what, upon the whole, tended moft to the happiness of mankind, was not also morally good, was never once, he said, made a question.

Since benevolence, therefore, was the only motive which could beftow upon any action the character of virtue, the greater the benevolence which was evidenced by any action, the greater the praise which must belong to it.

Thofe actions which aimed at the happiness of a great community, as they demonftrated a more enlarged benevolence than those which aimed only at that of a smaller fyftem, fo were they, likewife, proportionally the more virtuous. The most virtuous of all affections, therefore, was that which embraced as its object the happiness of all intelligent beings. The leaft virtuous, on the contrary, of thofe to which the character of virtue could in any respect belong, was that which aimed no further than at the happinefs of an individual, fuch as a fon, a brother, a friend.

In directing all our actions to promote the greatest poffible good, in fubmitting all inferior affections to the defire of the general happinefs of mankind, in regarding ones felf but as one of the many, whofe profperity

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profperity was to be pursued no further than it was confiftent with, or conducive to that of the whole, confifted the perfection of virtue.

Self-love was a principle which could never be virtuous in any degree or in any direction. It was vicious whenever it obftructed the general good. When it had no other effect than to make the individual take care of his own happiness, it was. merely innocent, and tho' it deferved no praife, neither ought it to incur any blame. Thofe benevolent actions which were performed, notwithstanding fome ftrong motive from felf-intereft, were the more virtuous upon that account. They demonftrated the ftrength and vigour of the benevolent principle.

*

Dr. Hutchefon was fo far from allowing felflove to be in any cafe a motive of virtuous actions, that even a regard to the pleasure of self-approbation, to the comfortable applause of our own confciences, according to him, diminished the merit of a benevolent action. This was a felfifh motive, he thought, which, fo far as it contributed to any action, demonstrated the weakness of that pure and difinterested benevolence which could alone ftamp upon the conduct of man the character of virtue. In the common judgments of mankind, however, this regard to the approbation of our own minds is fo far from being confidered as what can in any respect diminish the virtue of any action, that it is rather looked upon as the fole motive which deferves the appellation of virtuous.

Such

* Inquiry concerning virtue, fect. 2. art. 4, alfo illustrations on the moral fenfe, fect. 5. laft paragraph,