over either grief or refentment, though they may often have more humanity, more generofity, and a nicer sense of honour, yet feldom poffefs that equality of temper which is fo common among men of the world.

UPON thefe two different efforts, upon that

of the spectator to enter into the sentiments of the perfon principally concerned, and upon that of the perfon principally concerned, to bring down his emotions to what the fpectator can go along with, are founded two different fets of virtues. The foft, the gentle, the amiable virtues, the virtues of candid condefcenfion and indulgent humanity, are founded upon the one the great, the awful and refpectable, the virtues of felf-denial, of felf-government, of that command of the paffions which fubjects all the movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct require, derive their origin from the other.

How amiable does he appear to be, whose fympathetic heart seems to re-echo all the fentiments of those with whom he converfes, who grieves for their calamities, who refents their injuries, and re

joices at their good fortune! When we bring home to ourselves the fituation of his companions, we enter into their gratitude, and feel what confolation they must derive from the tender fympathy of fo affectionate a friend. And for a contrary reafon, how disagreeable does he appear to be, whofe hard and obdurate heart feels for himself only, but is altogether infenfible of the happiness or misery of others! We enter, in this cafe too, into the pain which his prefence muft give to every mortal with whom he converses, to those especially with whom we are moft apt to fympathize, the unfortunate and the injured.

On the other hand, what noble propriety and grace do we feel in the conduct of thofe who, in their own cafe, exert that recollection and felfcommand which conftitute the dignity of every paffion, and which bring it down to what others can enter into? We are difgufted with that clamorous grief, which, without any delicacy, calls upon our compaffion with fighs and tears and importunate lamentations. But we reverence that referved, that filent and majestic forrow, which discovers itself only in the fwelling of the eyes, in the quivering of the lips and cheeks, and in the diftant, but affecting, coldness of the whole behaviour. It impofes the like filence upon us. We regard it with refpectful attention, and watch with anxious concern over our whole behaviour, left by any impropriety we should disturb that concerted tranquillity, which it requires fo great an effort to fupport.

The infolence and brutality of anger, in the fame manner when we indulge its fury without check or reftraint,

reftraint, is, of all fubjects, the most deteftable. But we admire that noble and generous refentment which governs its pursuit of the greatest injuries, not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the breaft of the fufferer, but by the indignation which they naturally call forth in that of the impartial spectator; which allows no word, no gefture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable sentiment would dictate; which never, even in thought, attempts any greater vengeance, nor defires to inflict any greater punishment, than what every indifferent perfon would rejoice to fee executed.

And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to reftrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, conftitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of fentiments and paffions in which confift their whole grace and propriety. As to love our neighbour as we love ourfelves is the great law of chriftianity, fo it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the fame thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us.

As tafte and good judgment, when they are confidered as qualities which deferve praise and admiration, are supposed to imply a delicacy of fentiment and an acuteness of understanding not commonly to be met with; fo the virtues of fenfibility and felfcommand are not apprehended to confift in the ordinary, but in the uncommon degrees of thofe qualities. The amiable virtue of humanity requires, furely, a fenfibility, much beyond what is poffeffed by the rude vulgar of mankind. The great and exalted

exalted virtue of magnanimity undoubtedly demands much more than that degree of felf-command, which the weakeft of mortals are capable of exerting. As in the common degree of the intellectual qualities, there are no abilities; fo in the common degree of the moral, there is no virtue. Virtue is excellence, fomething uncommonly great and beautiful, which rifes far above what is vulgar and ordinary. The amiable virtues confift in that degree of fenfibility which furprizes by its exquifite and unexpected delicacy and tenderness. The awful and refpectable, in that degree of self-command which astonishes by its amazing fuperiority over the most ungovernable paffions of human nature,

There is, in this respect, a confiderable difference between virtue and mere propriety; between those qualities and actions which deferve to be admired and celebrated, and those which simply deserve to be approved of. Upon many occafions, to act with the most perfect propriety, requires no more than that common and ordinary degree of fenfibility or felf-command which the most worthlefs of mankind are poffeffed of, and fometimes even that degree is not neceffary. Thus, to give a very low inftance, to eat when we are hungry, is certainly, upon ordinary occafions, perfectly right and proper, and cannot mifs being approved of as fuch by every body. Nothing, however, could be more abfurd than to fay it is virtuous.

On the contrary, there may frequently be a confiderable degree of virtue in those actions, which fall fhort of the most perfect propriety; because they may ftill approach nearer to perfection than

could

could well be expected upon occafions in which it was fo extremely difficult to attain it: and this is very often the cafe upon thofe occafions which require the greatest exertions of felf-command. There are fome fituations which bear fo hard upon human nature, that the greatest degree of felf-government, which can belong to fo imperfect a creature as man, is not able to stifle, altogether, the voice of human weakness, or reduce the violence of the paflions to that pitch of moderation, in which the impartial fpectator can entirely enter into them. Though in thofe cafes, therefore, the behaviour of the fufferer fall fhort of the most perfect propriety, it may ftill deferve fome applaufe, and even in a certain fenfe, may be denominated virtuous. It may ftill manifeft an effort of generosity and magnanimity of which the greater part of men are incapable; and though it fails of abfolute perfection, it may be a much nearer approximation towards perfection, than what, upon fuch trying occafions, is commonly either to be found or to be expected.

In cafes of this kind, when we are determining the degree of blame or applaufe which feems due to any action, we very frequently make ufe of two different standards. The firft is the idea of complete propriety and perfection, which, in thofe difficult fituations, no human conduct ever did, or eves can come up to, and in comparison with which the actions of all men muft for ever appear blameable and imperfect. The fecond is the idea of that degree of proximity or diftance from this com→ plete perfection, which the actions of the greater part of men commonly arrive at. Whatever goes beyond this degree, how far foever it may be re

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