CHA P. III.

Of the final cause of this irregularity of fenti

SUCH

ments.

CH is the effect of the good or bad confequence of actions upon the fentiments both of the person who performs them, and of others; and thus, Fortune, which governs the world, has fome influence where we should be leaft willing to allow her any, and directs in fome measure the fentiments of mankind, with regard to the character and conduct both of themselves and others. That the world judges by the event, and not by the defign, has been in all ages the complaint, and is the great discouragement of virtue. Every body agrees to the general maxim, that as the event does not depend on the agent, it ought to have no influence upon your fentiments, with regard to the merit or propriety of his conduct. But when we come to particulars, we find that our fentiments are fcarce in any one inftance exactly conformable to what this equitable maxim would direct. The happy or unprofperous event of any action, is not only apt to give us a good or bad opinion of the prudence with which it was conducted, but almost always too animates our gratitude or refentment, our fenfe of the merit or demerit of the defign.

Nature, however, when the implanted the feeds of this irregularity in the human breast, seems, as upon all other occafions, to have intended the happinefs and perfection of the fpecies. If the hurtfulness of the defign, if the malevolence of the affection, were alone the caufes which excited our refentment, we should feel all the furies of that paffion against any perfon in whofe breast we fufpected or believed fuch defign's or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any actions, Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of mankind ran as high against them as against actions; if the basenefs of the thought which had given birth to no action, feemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as the bafenefs of the action, every court of judicature would become a real inquifition. There would be no fafety for the moft innocent and circumfpect conduct. Bad wishes, bad views,bad defigns, might still be fufpected; and while these excited the fame indignation with bad conduct, while bad intentions were as much refented as bad actions, they would equally expofe the perfon to punishment and refentment. Actions therefore which either produce actual evil, or attempt to produce it, and thereby put us in the immediate fear of it, are by the Author of nature rendered the only proper and approved objects of human punishment and resentment. Sentiments, defigns, affections, though it is from these that according to cool reafon human actions derive their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurifdiction, and are referved for the cognizance of his own unerring tribunal.

That

That neceffary rule of juftice, therefore, that men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their defigns and intentions, is founded upon this falutary and useful irregularity in human fentiments concerning merit or demerit, which at first fight appears fo abfurd and unaccountable. But every part of nature, when attentively furveyed, equally demonftrates the providential care of its Author, and we may admire the wisdom and goodnefs of God even in the weakness and folly of

men.

Nor is that irregularity of fentiments altogether without its utility, by which the merit of an unfuccessful attempt to serve, and much more that of mere good inclinations and kind wishes, appears to be imperfect. Man was made for action, and to promote by the exertion of his faculties fuch changes in the external circumftances both of himself and others, as may seem most favourable to the happinefs of all. He must not be fatisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind, because in his heart he wishes well to the profperity of the world. That he may call forth the whole vigour of his foul, and ftrain every nerve, in order to produce thofe ends which it is the purpose of his being to advance, Nature has taught him, that neither himself nor mankind can be fully fatisfied with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full measure of applaufe, unless he has actually produced them. He is made to know, that the praife of good intentions, without the merit of good offices, will be but of little avail to excite either the loudeft acclamations of the world, or even the highest degree of felf-applause. The man who has performed no fingle action of importance, but whofe whole converfation

and

and deportment exprefs the jufteft, the nobleft, and moft generous fentiments, can be entitled to demand no very high reward, even though his inutility fhould be owing to nothing but the want of an opportunity to ferve. We can ftill refufe it him without blame. We can still ask him, what have you done? What actual service can you produce, to entitle you to fo great a recompense? We esteem you, and love you; but we owe you nothing. To reward indeed that latent virtue which has been useless only for want of an opportunity to serve, to bestow upon it those honours and preferments, which, though in fome measure it may be faid to deferve them, it could not with propriety have infifted upon, is the effect of the most divine benevolence. To punish, on the contrary, for the affections of the heart only, where no crime has been committed, is the moft infolent and barbarous tyranny. The benevolent affections seem to deserve most praise, when they do not wait till it becomes almoft a crime for them not to exert themfelves. The malevolent, on the contrary, can scarce be too tardy, too flow, or deliberate.

It is even of use that the evil which is done without design should be regarded as a misfortune to the doer as well as to the fufferer. Man is thereby taught to reverence the happiness of his brethren, to tremble left he should, even unknowingly, do any thing that can hurt them, and to dread that animal refentment which he feels is ready to burft out against him, if he should without defign be the unhappy inftrument of their calamity.

Notwithstanding, however, all these feeming irregularities of fentiment, if man thould unfortunately

either

either give occafion to those evils which he did not intend, or fail in producing that good which he intended, nature has not left his innocence altogether without confolation, nor his virtue altogether without reward. He then calls to his affiftance that just and equitable maxim, that those events which did not depend upon our conduct ought not to diminish the esteem that is due to us. He fummons up his whole magnanimity and firmness of foul, and ftrives to regard himself, not in the light in which he at prefent appears, but in that in which he ought to appear, in which he would have appeared had his generous defigns been crowned with fuccefs, and in which he would ftill appear, notwithstanding their miscarriage, if the fentiments of mankind were either altogether candid and equitable, or even perfectly confiftent with themselves. The more candid and humane part of mankind entirely go along with the efforts which he thus makes to fupport himself in his own opinion. They exert theirwhole generosity and greatness of mind, to correct in themselves this irregularity of human nature, and endeavour to regard his unfortunate magnanimity in the fame light in which, had it been fuccessful, they would, without any fuch generous exertion, have naturally been difpofed to confider it.

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