made use of, both by the perfon whom he is about to injure, and by others, either to obstruct the execution of his crime,, or to punish him when he has executed it. And upon this is founded that remarkable diftinction between juftice and all the other focial virtues, which has of late been particularly infifted upon by an author of very great and original genius, that we feel ourselves to be under a stricter obligation to act according to justice, than agreeably to friendship, charity, or generofity; that the practice of these last mentioned virtues feems to be left in fome measure to our own choice, but that, fomehow or other, we feel ourfelves to be in a peculiar manner tied, bound, and obliged to the obfervation of justice. We feel, that is to say, that force may, with the utmost propriety and with the approbation of all mankind, be made ufe of to constrain us to obferve the rules of the one, but not to follow the precepts of the other. We must always, however, carefully diftinguish what is only blamable, or the proper object of difapprobation, from what force may be employed either to punish or to prevent. That feems blamable which falls fhort of that ordinary degree of proper beneficence which experience teaches us to expect of every body; and on the contrary, that feems praife-worthy which goes beyond it. The ordinary degree itself, seems neither blamable nor praiseworthy. A father, a fon, a brother, who behaves to the correfpondent relation, neither better nor worse than the greater part of men commonly do, feems properly to deferve neither praife nor blame He who furprises us by extraordinary and unexpec ed, though ftill proper and fuitable kindness, or on the contrary, by extraordinary and unexpected, as well as unfuitable unkindness, feems praise-worthy in the one cafe, and blamable in the other. Even the moft ordinary degree of kindness or beneficence, however, cannot, among equals, be extorted by force. Among equals each individual is naturally, and antecedent to the inftitution of civil government, regarded as having a right both to defend himself from injuries, and to exact a certain degree of punishment for thofe which have been done to him. Every generous fpectator not only approves of his conduct when he does this, but enters fo far into his fentiments as often to be willing to aflist him. When one man attacks, or robs, or attempts to murder another, all the neighbours take the alarm, and think that they do right when they run, either to revenge the perfon who has been injured, or to defend him who is in danger of being fo. But when a father fails in the ordinary degree of parental affection towards a fon; when a fon feems to want that filial reverence which might be expected to his father; when brothers are without the ufual degree of brotherly affection; when a man shuts his breast against compaffion, and refuses to relieve the mifery of his fellow-creatures, when he can with the greatest ease; in all these cases, though every body blames the conduct, nobody imagines that those who might have reason, perhaps, to expect more kindness, have any right to extort it by force. The fufferer can only complain, and the spectator can intermeddle no other way than by advice and persuasion. Upon all fuch occafions, for equals to use force against against one another, would be thought the highest degree of infolence and prefumption. C A fuperior may, indeed, fometimes, with univerfal approbation, oblige thofe under his jurifdiction to behave, in this refpect, with a certain degree of propriety to one another. The laws of all civilized nations oblige parents to maintain their children, and children to maintain their parents, and impofe upon men many other duties of beneficence. The civil magiftrate is entrusted with the power not only of preferving the public peace by reftraining injuftice, but of promoting the profperity of the commonwealth, by establishing good difcipline, and by difcouraging every fort of vice and impropriety; he may prescribe rules, therefore, which not only prohibit mutual injuries among fellow citizens, but command mutual good offices to a certain degree, When the fovereign commands what is merely indifferent, and what, antecedent to his orders, might have been omitted without any blame, it becomes not only blamable but punishable to difobey him, When he commands, therefore, what, antecedent to any fuch order, could not have been omitted without the greatest blame, it furely becomes much more punishable to be wanting in obedience. Of all the duties of a law-giver, however, this, perhaps, is that which it requires the greatest delicacy and referve to execute with propriety and judgment. To neglect it altogether exposes the common-wealth to many grofs disorders and fhocking enormities, and to push it too far is deftructive of all liberty, fecurity, and juftice. Though Though the mere want of beneficence feems to merit no punishment from equals, the greater exertion's of that virtue appear to deferve the highest reward. By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and approved objects of the livelieft gratitude. Though the breach of justice, on the contrary, exposes to punishment, the observance of the rules of that virtue feems fcarce to deserve any reward. There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of juftice, and it merits, upon that account, all the approbation which is due to propriety. But as it does no real positive good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. Mere justice is,. upon most occafions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abftains from violating either the perfon, or the eftate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has furely very little pofitive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called juftice, and does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of juftice by fitting ftill and doing nothing. As every man doth, fo fhall it be done to him, and retaliation feems to be the great law which is dictated to us by Nature. Beneficence and generofity we think due to the generous and beneficent. Those whose hearts never open to the feelings of humanity, fhould, we think, be fhut out in the fame manner, from the affections of all their fellowcreatures, and be allowed to live in the midft of fociety, as in a great defert where there is no-body to care for them, or to inquire after them. The vió lator lator of the laws of juftice ought to be made to feel himself that evil which he has done to another; and fince no regard to the fufferings of his brethren are capable of restraining him, he ought to be over-awed by the fear of his own. The man who is barely innocent, who only obferves the law of juftice with regard to others, and merely abftains from hurting his neighbours, can merit only that his neighbours in their turn fhould refpect his innocence, and that the fame laws should be religiously obferved with regard to him. CHAP. II. Of the fenfe of justice, of remorse, and of the confcioufness of merit. THERE can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except juft indignation for evil which that other has done to us. To disturb his happiness merely because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real use to him merely because it may be of equal or more use to us, or to indulge, in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own happinefs above that of other people, is what no impartial fpectator can go along with. Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of |