with us, as to have endowed us with any principle which is wholly in every refpect evil, or which, in no degree and in no direction, can be the proper object of praife and approbation. Upon fome occafions we are fenfible that this paffion, which is generally too frong, may likewise be too weak. We fometimes complain that a particular perfon fhews too little fpirit, and has too little fenfe of the injuries that have been done to him; and we are as 'ready to defpife him for the defect, as to hate him for the excess of .. this paffion.

The infpired writers would not furely have talked fo frequently or fo ftrongly of the wrath and anger of God, if they had regarded every degree of thofe paffions as vicious and evil, even in so weak and imperfect a creature as man.

Let it be confidered too, that the prefent inquiry is not concerning a matter of right, if I may fay fo, but concerning a matter of fact. We are not at prefent examining upon what principles a perfect being would approve of the punishment of bad actions; but upon what principles fo weak and imperfect a creature as man actually and in fact approves of it. The principles which I have just now mentioned, it is evident, have a very great effect upon his fentiments; and it seems wifely ordered that it fhould be fo. The very existence of fociety requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice fhould be restrained by proper punishments; and confequently, that to inflict thofe punishments fhould be regarded as a proper and laudable action. Though man, therefore, be naturally endowed with a defire of the welfare and prefervation of fociety, yet the Author of nature has not entrusted it to his reason to find out that a certain application of punishments is the proper means of attaining this end; but has endowed him with an immediate and instinctive approbation of that very application which is moft proper to attain it. The economy of nature is in this respect exactly of a piece with what it is upon many other occafions. With regard to all those ends which, upon account of their peculiar importance, may be regarded, if fuch an expreffion is allowable, as the favourite ends of nature, she has conftantly in this manner not only endowed mankind with an appetite for the end which she propoles, but likewife with an appetite for the means by which alone this end can be brought about, for their own fakes, and independent of their tendency to produce it. Thus felf prefervation, and the propagation of the fpecies, are the great ends which Nature feems to have proposed in the formation of all animals. Mankind are

I 3

endowed

endowed with a defire of those ends, and an averfion to the contrary; with a love of life, and a dread of diffolution; with a defire of the continuance and perpetuity of the fpecies, and with an averfion to the thoughts of its intire extinction. But though we are in this manner endowed with a very strong defire of those ends, it has not been intrufted to the flow and uncertain determinations of our reafon, to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instincts. Hunger, thirft, the paffion which unites the two fexes, the love of pleafure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply thofe means for their own fakes, and without any confideration of their tendency to thofe beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.

Before I conclude this note, I must take notice of a difference between the approbation of propriety and that of merit or beneficence. Before we approve of the fentiments of any perfon as proper and suitable to their objects, we must not only be affected in the fame manner as he is, but we must perceive this harmony and correfpondence of fentiments between him and ourselves. Thus, though upon hearing of a misfortune that had befallen my friend, I fhould conceive precisely that degree of concern which he gives way to; yet till I am informed of the manner in which he behaves, till I perceive the harmony between his emotions and mine, I cannot be faid to approve of the fentiments which influence his behaviour. The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we fhould intirely fympathize with the person who acts, but that we fhould perceive this perfect concord between his fentiments and our own. On the contrary, when I hear of a benefit that has been beftowed upon another perfon, let him who has received it be affected in what manner he pleases, if, by bringing his cafe home to myself, I feel gratitude arife in my own breaft, I neceffarily approve of the conduct of his benefactor, and regard it as meritorious, and the proper object of reward. Whether the perfon who has received the benefit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our fentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestow ed it. No actual correfpondence of fentiments, therefore, is here required. It is fufficient that if he was grateful, they would corretpond; and our sense of merit is often founded upon one of those illufive fympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the cafe of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the perfon principally concerned is incapable of being affected. There is a fimilar difference between our disapprobation of demerit, and that of impropriety.

1

SEC

SECTION II.

Of juftice and beneficence,

CHA P. I.

Comparison of those two virtues.

ACTIONS of a beneficent tendency, which pro

ceed from proper motives, feem alone to require reward; because fuch alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the fympathetic gratitude of the fpectator,

Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, feem alone to deferve punishment, because such alone are the approved objects of refentment, or excite the fympathetic refentment of the fpectator.

Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment because the mere want of beneficence tends ; to do no real pofitive evil. It may disappoint of the good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it may juftly excite diflike and difapprobation; it cannot, however, provoke

any refentment which mankind will go along with. The man who does not recompenfe his benefactor, when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his affistance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackeft ingratitude. The heart of every impartial spectator rejects all fellow-feeling with the selfishness of his motives, and he is the proper object of the highest difapprobation. But still he does no positive hurt to any body. He only does not do that good which in propriety he ought to have done. He is the object of hatred, a paffion which is naturally excited by impropriety of fentiment and behaviour; not of resentment,a paffion which is never properly called forth but by actions which tend to do real and positive hurt to fome particular perfons. His want of gratitude, therefore, cannot be punished. To oblige him by force to perform what in gratitude he ought to perform, and what every impartial spectator would approve of him for performing, would if poffible, be ftill more improper than his neglecting to perform it. His benefactor would dishonour himself if he attempted by violence to constrain him to gratitude, and it would be impertinent for any third perfon, who was not the fuperior of either, to intermeddle. But of all the duties of beneficence, thofe which gratitude recommends to us approach nearest to what is called a perfect and complete obligation. What friendship, what generofity, what charity, would prompt us to do with universal approbation, is still more free, and can ftill lefs be extorted by force than the duties of gratitude. We talk of the debt of gratitude, not of charity, or generofity, nor even of friendship, when friendship is mere esteem, and has not been enhanced and complicated with gratitude for good offices.

Refent

Refentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only. It is the fafeguard of juftice and the fecurity of innocence. It prompts us to beat off the mifchief which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done; that the offender may be made to repent of his injuftice, and that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. It must be reserved therefore for thefe purpofes, nor can the fpectator ever go along with it when it is exerted for any other. But the mere want of the beneficent virtues, though it may difappoint us of the good which might reasonably be expected, neither does, nor attempts to do, any mifchief from which we can have occafion to defend ourfelves.

There is however another virtue, of which the obfervance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the violation expofes to refentment, and confequently to punishment. This virtue is juftice: the violation of juftice is injury it does real and pofitive hurt to fome particular perfons, from motives which are naturally difapproved of. It is, therefore, the proper object of refentment, and of punishment, which is the natural confequence of refentment. As man÷ kind go along with, and approve of, the violence employed to avenge the hurt which is done by injuftice, fo they much more go along with, and approve of, that which is employed to prevent and at off the injury, and to reftrain the offender m hurting his neighbours. The perfon himself meditates an injuftice is fenfible of this, and that force may, with the utmoft propriety, be

made