PLEASURE the beft RELIGION;

OR,

The Right of Mankind to do what they will, afferted:

A

SERMON.

PROVERBS iii. Ver. 17. Her Ways are Ways of Pleasantness, and all her Paths are Peace.

N confidering these words, I fhall endeavour to show,

ift, That if the ways of religion are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths the paths of peace,

mankind must have a right to do what they will.

2dly, I fhall prove that there is no pleasure in the practice of any one virtue whatsoever, and confequently that virtue can be no part of that religion whofe ways are ways of pleasantness. Z

3dly,

3dly, I fhall answer fome objections, and fa conclude.

In the first place I am to fhow, that if the ways of religion are ways of pleafantnefs, and all her paths are paths of peace, mankind must have a right to do what they will.

There is no propofition more evident, no maxim more generally granted, than that liberty is effential to happiness. This therefore I hope will not be contested with me. Now I fhall endeavour to prove, that the very effence of liberty confifts in doing what one will. Man is a free agent; observe, I befeech you, the ftrength and concifenefs of my reafoning; man, I fay, is a free agent. Now whatsoever is a free agent, must be fuppofed in all circumftances to have a liberty of acting or not acting; therefore every man has a liberty of doing what he will. But fome of you perhaps will object, that there is a difference between the liberty of doing what one will, and the right of fo doing. Now, tho' the reasoning of the pulpit might very well countenance me in fuch a trifling inaccuracy, yet I fcorn to take fanctuary under fo poor an indulgence. I will make this matter fo plain, that the meanest capacity in this congregation fhall most easily comprehend it. I love to preach to the common level of the common people; and this ought to be the rule of every preacher, who has not more at heart the oftentation of his own learning, than the inftruction

of his hearers. But to the point. Mankind have a right to happiness; liberty is effential to happiness; therefore every man has a right to liberty. Now if every man has a right to liberty, and the very effence of liberty confifts (as before afferted) in doing what one will, then every man has undoubtedly a right fo to do. This reafoning is fo ftrong and ・ conclufive, that I am under no apprehenfion of its be ing thought that the privilege of the pulpit alone fecures me from contradiction. The thing speaks itfelf, and every action we do confirms the truth of it. How ready are we upon all occafions to cry out, I will do fo and fo, or I will not do fo and fo? Now if mankind had not a right to do what they will, thefe phrafes would be abfurd and ridiculous. Befides, we have the authority of fcripture to fupport this our opinion. St. Paul, fpeaking of a young man, fays, let him do what he will he finneth not. In the twelfth chapter of Deuteronomy it is written, we do here this day every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes. And in the twenty-fifth chapter of Leviticus, the Jews are commanded to proclaim liberty (that is, a right of doing what they will) throughout all the land, and to all the inhabitants thereof. Nay David, the man after God's own heart, declares, Pfalm cxix. ver. 45. that he will walk at liberty. Now if any man should pretend to say that these texts are not fairly quoted, I will fhow him a hundred texts in the very graveft authors more perverfly quoted by half. And thus I think I have fufficiently prov'd, both from reafon and scripture, that mankind have an undoubted right to do what they will. Z 2

2dly,

2dly, I am to prove, That there is no pleasure in the practice fo any one virtue whatsoever, and confequently that virtue can be no part of that religion whofe ways are ways of pleasantness.

Every body is fenfible of, and cries out upon the mischiefs which arife from religious difputes. The warmth and animofity with which men are divided against each other, and the rage and fury with which they hate and perfecute each other on account of their different opinions, are melancholy confiderations. Happy were it for mankind, if a way could be found to put an end to this tumultuous extravagance, to tune their jarring paffions, and unite them all in brotherly love and affection; and well would that man deferve from his fellow creatures who fhould accomplish the glorious task. Let us try what can be done.

It has been allow'd by the beft divines, that the only end, or at least the chief motive, which God could have for creating us, was our own happiness : I fhall therefore take this for granted, without enquiring any farther into the truth of it, and confine myself only to feek by what means this great end is beft to be acquir'd.

Some late writers have made a great ftir with virtue, the real, the intrinfick pleasures of virtue. But I am in hopes that one fingle obfervation will be fufficient to establish it in the minds of all this good

congre

congregation, that pleasure and virtue are two different things. It is this: Mankind are naturally prone to feek their own pleasure or happiness, this is allow'd, this they are upbraided with, and on all hands blam'd for; but if their hypothefis is to be granted, who place happiness or pleasure in the practice of virtue, it will evidently follow that mankind are prone to virtue; which I am perfuaded, my dear brethren, you all know and feel to be fo far from truth, that I need not infift any further on the falfity of it. No, I believe it will eafily be granted me, that the strongest bent of mankind is to what fome call vices, but what I fhall call natural pleasures, and which, if happiness is the end of our creation, muft confequently be allowed to be the readieft means of accomplishing that end. But I am now, for the fake of some few who may be obftinate in this error of the happiness of virtue, and harden'd infidels with respect to the duty of natural pleasure ; for the fake of fuch as thefe, I fay, I am now to prove more particularly, that there is no fuch thing as happiness in the practice of any one virtue whatsoever,

Let us try first in Charity.

Charity, according to St. Paul's definition of it, beareth all things, hopeth all things, believeth all things. Now I wonder where the happiness or the sense of practifing fuch a virtue as this can lie? I appeal to all mankind, whether he that beareth all things is not a great fool, whether he that hopeth all things is not a greater fool, and whether he that believeth al things is not the greatest fool of all? But charity is faid to cover a multitude of fins; so does hypocrify,

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