X. 1808. June. CHAP. within reach of assistance from Spain, or, if need were, of an asylum in that kingdom. Nor would Coimbra be like some of the smaller towns, overlooked as unworthy of vengeance. Next to the capital itself there was no place in Portugal where a terrible example would so deeply impress and intimidate the nation: it was within easy reach of the enemy, from Almeida as well as from Lisbon, and all military means of defence were Neves, i wanting: a few pounds of powder were all that could be found in the city, and not one piece of iii. 219-223. Preparations for defence. Neves, iii. 223-225. cannon. On the other hand, more talents and enterprise, such as the times required, might reasonably be expected in Coimbra than in any other of the Portugueze towns. It was a populous and flourishing university, the only one in the kingdom here therefore the flower of the Portugueze youth would be found, just at that age when they would be most willing and fit for service; and of that rank, and in that place, where national and generous feelings would have their strongest influence. If any where heads to plan and hands to execute might be found, it would be here. Accordingly no exertions were wanting. Chemists made gunpowder, geometricians directed works of defence, old soldiers were employed, some in making cartridges, others in training volunteers; mechanics were set to work in whatever manner they might be most useful; bridges were broken down, roads broken up, means made ready for defending the streets, if the enemy should enter the city, and CHAP. a strict police established. X. 1808. June. against Fi When one day had been passed in these arrangements and preparations an expedition was Successful planned against Figueira da Foz, a small town expedition and fort at the mouth of the Mondego, on the gueira. right bank, seven leagues from Coimbra. The French had a garrison of an hundred men there. Forty volunteers, who were almost all students, under the command of Bernardo Antonio Zagalo, a student also, set out at evening, in hope June 25. of capturing this important point: they relied upon increasing their numbers on the way, and they took with them authority from the governor to raise the country as they went. Zagalo, with four horsemen, took the right bank, the rest of the party the left: they met at Monte-mor o Velho, and marching all night, appeared with the reinforcements which they had gathered, now some 3000 in number, before Figueira, at seven in the morning. The enemy were taken by surprise; they were dispersed about the town, when they saw this multitude approach; but immediately retiring into the fort, they prepared for defence. The place might have been easily defended against a crowd of peasants, more of whom were armed with pikes and reapinghooks than with fowling-pieces, and who were likely, upon the slightest loss or disgust, to abandon their enterprise as precipitately as they had engaged in it. But the French, relying too confidently upon the submission of the Portu VOL. II. G X. 1808. June. CHAP. gueze, had neglected to store the fort with ргоvisions; and Zagalo summoned them, saying he knew they had not food for more than four-andtwenty hours, and that if they did not surrender they should all be put to the sword. Contrary to his usual policy, Junot had given the command of this fort to a Portugueze lieutenant of engineers; this person demurred at surrendering, because his family were at Peniche, in the power of the French. But, wanting either the will or the ability to exert himself in the enemy's service, he remained inactive and confounded, till the following day, when Zagalo received positive orders from Coimbra to return immediately with all his people. This enabled the commander to obtain terms which might be pleaded to save his credit; and he capitulated on condition that the garrison should be allowed to cross the river with their arms and knapsacks, but without powder and ball; and to march unmolested to Peniche, the nearest strong place in possession of the French. Upon these terms the fort was given up; but the peasantry searched the men when they were embarking, and finding that some of them had concealed a few cartridges, declared that the conditions were broken: they themselves were desirous of breaking them, and therefore gladly found this pretext; and the Neves, iii. French would have been massacred if the students had not exerted themselves to protect them, and lodged them safely as prisoners at Coimbra. 226-233. A report of Loison's sudden approach had CHAP. occasioned the order for recalling Zagalo. X. Ge 1808. June. Loison or march from Porto. neral Count Loison had been sent in the latter end of May, with 4000 troops, to Almeida, in pursuance of positive and repeated instructions dered to from Murat when exercising the command in Almeida to Madrid. He was to concert his movements with Bessieres, and, if necessary, to join him; he was to observe Salamanca, and secure Ciudad Rodrigo, if that were practicable. But the Spaniards were too much awakened to be again deceived or surprised by the French; and Loison having remained at Almeida from the 5th of June till the 16th, received orders from Junot to march upon Porto, take the command in that city, and keep the northern provinces in subjection. He had previously got possession of Fort Conceiçam. Each party seems at this time to have been strangely ignorant of the movements and means of the other: Loison apprehended that an enemy's force might render it impossible for the French to maintain this fort; he therefore directed General Charlot, whom he left with the command at Almeida, to remove thither the guns from Conceiçam, keep it as long as he could, and destroy the works if he should be forced to evacuate it. He then began his march with two regiments June 17. of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and six pieces of artillery. A battalion of light infantry was to set Thiebault, out from Torres Vedras, and reach Porto at the same time. On the fourth day he reached Lamego with 148-150. X. 1808. Junc. He turns Mezam frio. CHAP. out the slightest resistance, and on the following morning crossed the Douro by the ferry at Regoa, and reached Mezam-frio, meaning to sleep there. His advanced guard was on the way to Amarante, back from which is only forty miles from Porto, when news was brought him while he was at dinner tha the mountaineers were defending the pass at Os Padroens da Teixeira; and presently a second ill messenger arrived with intelligence that his baggage was attacked at Regoa. These operations had been ably planned by Silveira, and were well executed. In so strong a country he deemed it better to turn back than to proceed at the risk of being surrounded by an armed population. An ambuscade among the vineyards at Santinho annoyed him greatly on his way toward the Douro, and he himself was slightly hurt. The Portugueze, when they were dislodged, retreated to the heights; the French took up a position for the night, and in the morning sacked the villages of Pezo and Regoa, where neither age, nor infirmity, nor sex, nor childhood, were spared by them; for Loison was one of those men after Buonaparte's own heart, who, being equally devoid of honour and humanity, carried on war in the worst spirit of the worst ages, plundering and massacring without shame and without remorse. He now understood that Porto, which he had expected to find discontented indeed, but passive and in subjection, had thrown off the yoke; that a Portugueze officer, with whom he maintained a secret cor |