XV. 1808. CHAP. English, to prevent their junction. He, meantime, placed nearly in the centre, between two divisions of his army, which were approaching from different points, was compelled to remain inactive. Perceiving what he thought the supineness of the Spanish government, and indignant at discovering the weakness of the Spaniards, he began to despair of their cause. He saw nothing around him but an inactivity, which he mistook for torpor and indifference. They had not, he said, shown themselves a wise or a provident people; their wisdom was not a wisdom of action. Yet still he felt that they were a fine people; that they had a character of their own, quite distinct from that of any other nation; and much, he thought, might have been done with them. He erred in thinking that they would not do much for themselves. Sir David Baird arrives at Astorga. Sir David Baird had formed a like opinion. The expedition under his command reached Coruña on the 13th of October; and such were the idle forms and the negligence of the Spanish authorities, that the troops were kept on ship-board till an order for their landing could be received · from the Central Junta. This General had been accustomed to an Indian army, with its train of slaves and sutlers, elephants and palanquins; he had now to march through a country where it is not without difficulty that a party of travellers can obtain food, and which had already been drained by its own troops; and his commissaries were not only inexperienced in the business of their department, but ignorant of the language XV. 1808. of the people. Dividing his army into small CHAP. detachments, which followed each other at considerable distance, he arrived at Astorga, Nov. 19th, and there learning the defeat of Blake's army, and anticipating that of Castaños's, he consulted with his general officers, and informed Sir John Moore of their unanimous opinion, that he ought not to advance till his whole force was assembled there, which would not be before the 4th of December. Sir John Moore's opinion of the hopelessness of affairs was thus confirmed by Sir David Baird. "I see my situation," he said in his journal, "as clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse; yet I am determined to form the junction of the army, and to try our fortune. We have no business here as things are; but, being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle." Moore re Portugal, from Lis Νου. 28. It was not long before intelligence arrived sir John that Castaños was defeated, and his army dis- solves to repersed. This event the British Commander had treat upon expected; it had always been his opinion that and embark the south of Spain ought to have been the scene bon. of action; that Cadiz, not Coruña, should have been chosen for the disembarkation of the English army, and Seville or Cordoba the place of their junction. He now determined to retreat upon Portugal..." Thus," he said, in a letter to the English ambassador, Mr. Frere," he should fall back 'upon his resources, cover a country where there was a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French detached CHAP. XV. 1808. a force against him, and be ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible. That such circumstances would occur he had no expectation. The French, he thought, would have little more to do to subdue the country than to march over it, though, after the conquest, they might have troublesome subjects." And, in his letter to Sir David Baird, ordering him to fall back upon Coruña, and sail from thence for the Tagus, he directed him to write immediately to England, and order that transports might be sent to Lisbon; "they will be wanted," said he; "for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended." He had written a few days before this to Lord Castlereagh, saying, that he had ordered a depôt of provisions, for a short consumption, to be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas; in that case, the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements made for taking off the army. Beyond this, the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of. In communicating his resolution of retiring to the British government, he wrote in the same spirit of utter despondency. "If the French," said he, "succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. Portugal could not be defended against a superior enemy; the Spaniards, however, might rally in the south, and the English might still be of use, if they were landed at Cadiz. But it was impossible to be very sanguine on this sub- CHAP. ject, after what had been seen." XV. 1808. the British dor. When this intention of retreating was made known to the army at Salamanca, murmurs against He asks the it were heard in every quarter, and from men of opinion of all ranks. Even the staff officers lamented the Ambassaresolution of their Commander. In his letter to Mr. Frere, written before the defeat of Castaños was known, Sir John Moore had proposed as a question, what the British army should do, in case of that event; whether he should retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into the heart of Spain, thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation?"This movement," he said, "would be one of great hazard, as his retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain, and he should be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps it was worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain were thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats." "The question," said Sir 'John Moore to Mr. Frere, "is not purely a military one. It belongs at least as much to you as to me to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government, and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered. You are perhaps better acquainted with the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would that cabinet direct, were they XV. 1808. CHAP. upon the spot to determine? It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share of responsibility. I am willing to take the whole, or a part; but I am very anxious to know your opinion." Mr. Frere knew that what the Spanish government most deprecated was, a retreat of the English upon Lisbon. It would sink the hearts of the whole country, and would make them believe that England, after an ineffectual effort, had relapsed into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore, a retreat were determined upon, as absolutely necessary, he thought the army should fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about Astorga. But he said, in his reply to the General, that Leon and the two Castilles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid) were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or provincial spirit in all Spain: the people had been passive during the late events, and had seen their country successively occupied by the strongest party. It was difficult to blame them: living in open villages, in vast plains, without arms and without horses, they had neither the means of defence or escape. That country must necessarily belong to the party which was superior in cavalry;.. yet even there there was no want of a right feeling; the towns were abandoned at the approach of the enemy; not a single magistrate had been brought over to take the oath of al |