CHAP. the armies of France. What hope could she have, XIII. 1808. Dec. 9. especially when France was irrevocably united with Russia? France and Russia could carry on the war till the court of London recurred to just and equitable dispositions; they were resolved to do so; and the English were admonished not to lose sight of the inevitable results of the force of states. Mr. Canning's replies were equally decided and swer of the dignified. To Count Romanzoff he expressed the British go- King's astonishment and regret, that it should be vernment. supposed he would consent to commence a negotiation by the previous abandonment of the cause of the Spanish nation, and of the legitimate monarchy of Spain, in deference to an usurpation which had no parallel in the history of the world. He had hoped that the participation of the Emperor Alexander in these overtures would have afforded a security to him against the proposal of a condition so unjust in its effect, and so fatal in its example. Nor could he conceive by what obligation of duty or of interest, or by what principle of Russian policy, his Imperial Majesty could have found himself compelled to acknowledge the right assumed by France, of deposing and imprisoning friendly Sovereigns, and forcibly transferring to herself the allegiance of loyal and independent nations. If these were indeed the principles to which the Emperor had inviolably attached himself, to which he had pledged the character and resources of his empire, and which he had united himself with XIII. 1808. France to establish by war, and to maintain in CHAP. peace.. deeply did the King of England lament a determination by which the sufferings of Europe must be aggravated and prolonged: but not to him was to be attributed the continuance of the calamities of war, by the disappointment of all hope of such a peace as would be compatible with justice and with honour. To the French minister Mr. Canning said, he was especially commanded to abstain from noticing any of those topics and expressions insulting to his Majesty, to his allies, and to the Spanish nation, with which the official note of M. Champagny abounded. The King of England was desirous to have treated for a peace which might have arranged the respective interests of all the belligerent powers on principles of equal justice, but he was determined not to abandon the cause of the Spanish nation, and of the legitimate monarchy of Spain; and the pretension of France, to exclude from the negotiation the central and supreme government, acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII., was one which he could not admit, without acquiescing in an usurpation unparalleled in the history of the world. claration. Dec. 15. As soon as this correspondence was concluded, British dethe rupture of the negotiation was made known in England, by a declaration which, while any sense of honour remains in the English nation, may always be recollected with pride and satisfaction. The continued appearance of a negotiation, it said, when peace was found to be utterly XIII. 1808. CHAP. unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy. It might enable France to sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who were combined to resist her oppression; and if, among the nations which were groaning under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintained against France a doubtful and precarious independence, there should be any who were balancing between the certain ruin of a prolonged inactivity and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that ruin.. to nations so situated, the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed, by the vain hope of returning tranquillity, or their purpose shaken, by the apprehension of being left to contend alone. That such was, in fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted from Erfurth, his Majesty entertained a strong persuasion. But at a moment when results, so awful from their importance, and so tremendous from their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision of peace or war, he felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the possibility of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies. It was difficult for him to believe that the Emperor of Russia had devoted himself so blindly and fatally to the violence and ambition of the power with which his Imperial Majesty had unfortunately become allied, as to be prepared openly to abet the usurpation of Spain. He therefore met the seeming fair XIII. 1808. ness and moderation of the proposal with fairness CHAP. and moderation on his part real and sincere, expressing his just confidence that the Spanish government, acting in the name of Ferdinand VII., was understood to be a party to this negotiation. The reply returned by France to this proposition cast off at once the thin disguise, which had been assumed for a momentary purpose, and displayed, with less than ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish nation was described by the degrading appellation of the Spanish insurgents, and the demand for the admission of its government as a party to any negotiation was rejected, as inadmissible and insulting. With astonishment, as well as grief, he had received from the Emperor of Russia a reply similar in effect, although less indecorous in tone and manner. The King would readily have embraced an opportunity of negotiation which might have afforded any hope or prospect of a peace compatible with justice and with honour. He lamented an issue by which the sufferings of Europe were prolonged; but neither his honour nor the generosity of the British nation would admit of his consenting to commence a negotiation by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who were contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man, and whose exertions, in a cause so unquestionably just, he had solemnly pledged himself to sustain. Such an answer was consistent with the ho XIII. 1808. departs for Oct. 25. CHAP. nour, the principles, and the feelings of the British people. Buonaparte anticipated it: his proposals might have that effect which the EnBuonaparte glish cabinet had foreseen, upon the powers Spain. which he oppressed, and they might deceive the French people; at least they gave a popular topic for his sycophants in the Senate, and those whose office it was to mislead the public mind. He himself knew what the result must be, and had not for a moment suspended or slackened his preparations. Before a reply could be made to the first overture, he returned to Paris, and, in his address to the legislative body, informed them that he should depart in a few days, to put himself in person at the head of his army, and, with God's help (such was the expression of the blasphemer), to crown the King of Spain in Madrid, and plant his eagles on the forts of Spain. It was a distinguished favour of the providence, he said, which had constantly protected his army, that passion had so far blinded the English councils, as to have made them abandon the defence of the seas, and at last produce their army on the continent. His vaunts and his impieties were, of course, echoed by those whom he addressed: but their flattery was far exceeded by the language of some deputies from the new Italian departments, who had audience on the same day. The destinies of the whole world, they told him, were confided by the Almighty to his impenetrable views, to the supreme power of his genius, to the miraculous exploits of his |