XI.

1808. August.

CHAP. true religion. It was indeed actually believed by the Portugueze that the British had brought with them a Moorish force: the Portugueze Consul in Barbary had in fact obtained from the Emperor of Morocco a promise of 200,000 cruzados for the service of Portugal; and this may have given occasion to a belief which was conObservador firmed by the appearance of the Highlanders: .. Portugues, their dress was immediately pronounced not to be Christian, and for a time no doubt was entertained but that these were the Moorish auxiliaries.

402.

Neves, v. 65, 118.

Movements of Laborde

The French apprehended that Sir Arthur and Loison. would move upon the Zezere and the Tagus, for the purpose of interposing between Loison's detachment and their main force. Laborde therefore proceeded by Villa Franca and Rio-Maior to Candieiros, where he encamped; from RioMaior he might either take the direction of Alcobaça, Leiria, or Thomar, and, it was hoped, co-operate with Loison, in case any attempt were made to prevent their junction. Learning, however, that the British army kept the line of the coast, and that Loison had crossed the Tagus without opposition, and was in no danger of being impeded in his march, he proceeded to AlcoThiebault, baça, where he found Thomieres. Junot had instructed him to reconnoitre the position of Batalha; the last ground, it might have been thought, on which an invader would have risked a battle; for there it was where Portugal, (and then also with English aid,) had achieved her

175.

CHAP.

XI.

1808.

August.

own deliverance in the battle of Aljubarrota, one
of the most signal and important victories in the
age of chivalry. The country was too open for
his force, and he therefore remained at Alco-
baça, watching the movements of the enemy,
and hoping to be joined by Loison. That ge-
neral, meantime, had suffered much on his march
through Alem-Tejo, from the excessive heat and
the want of water. Though there were none to
oppose them in the field or harass them, the
French felt what it was to be in a country where
every inhabitant regarded them with a deadly
hatred. Wherever they went the towns and vil-
lages were deserted; .. meat, wine, and even
bread, were wanting; and the persons who fell
into their hands, or perhaps remained in their
line for the purpose of deceiving them, sent them
out of their way in search of springs or rivulets,
which when they reached them were dry;..or
of stagnant waters, wherein hemp was steeped, Thiebault,
and of which, nauseous and noisome as it was,
the men could not be prevented from drinking
greedily. Many died of heat and exhaustion on

the
way; and they who from fatigue or sickness
fell behind, were killed by the peasantry.

172.

separates

Loison reached Abrantes on the 9th, crossing G. Freire the Tagus by the bridge of boats at that city. from the He rested there one day, and, leaving 200 men English. in garrison, proceeded on the next across the Zezere to Thomar, where he arrived on the same day that the main body of the English reached Leiria, the two cities being about thirty

XI.

1808.

August.

CHAP. miles from each other. Laborde was at Alcobaça, six leagues from the latter city, on the road to Lisbon. Their object had been to join at Leiria, but in this the British army had anticipated them; and as there was no practicable road for carriages between Thomar and Alcobaça, Loison could only effect a junction with Laborde by a circuitous route to the southward, and thus the latter general was exposed to be attacked alone. Bernardim de Freire, the Portugueze commander, in his former conferences with Sir Arthur, had expressed a wish that the British commissariat would supply his troops with British stores during the campaign. The impossibility of complying with so unreasonable a demand was pointed out; and Sir Arthur observed, that it was a new thing to require any army landing from its ships to supply not only its own consumption of meal, but also that of the native army which it was come to assist. He added, however, that he did not expect to have occasion to call upon the country for bread during his march towards Lisbon; but that beef, wine, and forage would be required, all of which the Bishop of Porto had engaged should be supplied. Notwithstanding this explanation, General Freire renewed the subject on his arrival at Leiria; and, instead of pursuing his march, the following morning, at the hour appointed, he sent a message to the British commander, saying, that unless the Portugueze were to be fed by the English commissariat, he would sepa

XI.

1808.

August.

rate them from the English army, and march for CHAP. Santarem by way of Thomar; urging as his reason, that supplies would be scarce on the straight road, but here there was great plenty, and he should also be in a situation to cut off the retreat of the French from Lisbon. Freire had voluntarily placed himself and his troops under Sir Arthur's command only the day preceding. There was another reason for this conduct, Motives for his separawhich he did not communicate to the British tion. General. A fear had come upon the Portugueze officers during the night, that Loison, whose arrival at Abrantes they knew, would turn upon the northern provinces; the fate of Beja and Evora was before their eyes, and they trembled for Coimbra. Their apprehensions were confirmed by the arrival that night of dispatches from the Governor of Coimbra, communicating to General Freire, as information of the utmost importance, that Laborde's orders were to amuse the Portugueze army, in order that Loison might pass in their rear and destroy that city; thus, the Governor added, it had been determined in a council of war at Lisbon, and the advice was sent to him by a person upon whom he had entire reliance. It is very possible that the advice came from the French themselves, for the purpose of deceiving him. General Freire began now to fear not only for his own retreat, but even that the English, if they met with a repulse, would be cut off from the Mondego, and unable to retire to their ships. The truth is, that he

CHAP.

XI.

1808.

79-81.

was unequal to his situation, and having persons about him of as little experience as himself, August. they confused one another. Concealing from Sir Arthur this, which was the real cause of Neves, v. his vacillation, he chose to separate upon the question of supplies. The danger of the plan was pointed out to him, but in vain: Sir Arthur urged him, equally in vain, to co-operate with the British army in the deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of his country, or of his Prince: he then requested him to send him 1000 infantry, with his cavalry, 250 in number, and his 400 light troops, engaging to feed them; and this was done. He advised him, at all events, to remain at Leiria, or Alcobaça, or any where in the rear of the English, that his troops might not be unnecessarily exposed to destruction; but notwithstanding he was now assured that the English General had found resources in the country fully adequate to their subsistence, he said he should persist in his plan. Sir Arthur, considering it of importance, on political grounds, that the Portugueze troops should accompany his march, would have undertaken to feed them, if he could have relied upon his commissariat; but this, he complained, was so ill * composed, as to be incapa

Sir Arthur, upon the court of inquiry, begged leave, in justice to the individuals composing this commissariat, to state, that he did not intend to complain of want of zeal, nor of any deficiency of exertion on their

part. "The fact is," said he,

that I wished to draw the attention of the government to this important branch of the service, which is but little understood in this country. The evils of which I complained are probably to be