use bases in Belgium from which to launch his raids. His airships, it is true, were soon driven further back by the activities of the Royal Naval Air Service against their sheds, but their greater range of action enabled them still to operate far over England. The first hostile bomb to fall on British soil was dropped from a German aeroplane near Dover on Dec. 24, 1914. It was not until the war was a good deal further advanced, however, that heavier-than-air craft became a serious menace. During the earlier stages the most formidable raids on London and the provinces were all carried out by airships. As time went on, however, night flying by our aeroplanes developed, and this, in conjunction with improvements to our anti-aircraft ground defences, caused increasing casualties to the intruders.

In May 1917 the great aeroplane raids may be said to have been inaugurated with the appearance of the first Gothas. As these and the later Giants increased in numbers so the airship raids diminished. In fact, costly experience proved that the lighter-than-air craft is not suitable for this class of warfare, at any rate until an uninflammable gas can be substituted for hydrogen. A comparison of the achievements of the German airship and aeroplane raiders throughout the war is interesting:

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Altogether there were just over a hundred raids in which nearly 9000 bombs, weighing in all about 280 tons, were dropped; 1413 people were killed and 3408 injured. London suffered most with 670 killed and 1962 injured. On the whole, however, this brutal form of warfare could scarcely have been worth the price which Germany had to pay for it. The cost of the airship campaign, especially, was enormous and the depressing effect of the losses of these much-vaunted weapons on the German nation probably counteracted any elation due to their early successes. Far from intimidating our own population, the air raids were regarded as insults to British territory and stiffened the national determination to endure and conquer while they hastened counter-measures.

Of more real consequence to us than any psychological effect was the demand made on men and materials for these counter-measures, the interruption caused by the raids to the output of munitions, and the periodical dislocation of work in factories, generally within the danger area. Material damage, although serious in places, was remarkably local, due mainly to the comparatively small size of most of the bombs dropped and to the limited radius of destruction when one fell in the open. The majority of the bombs carried by the Gothas and Giants were only 112 lbs., although some of 6 cwt. and possibly even heavier were released. Radius of action is, of course, determined to a very considerable extent by the weight of explosive carried, and the chances of hitting a definite object are, in turn, largely dependent on the number of bombs dropped.

Let us, however, assume that progress will be made and that in the course of a very few years there will be numerous aircraft capable of discharging 5000-lb. bombs at a distance of 500 miles from their starting-point. Then let us take London as being by far the nearest target of any great size to the Continent, and inscribe on a map of Eastern Europe a 500-mile arc with the British capital as centre. We shall find that, while Germany, which also comes within the arc, cannot be left

* Ref. 'The German Air Raids on Great Britain 1914-1918,' by Captain Joseph Morris.

out of account, there are only two foreign countries with considerable air forces any part of which falls within that area; they are France and Italy.

The Council of Ambassadors of April 1922, set up to give effect to the Versailles Treaty in air matters, evolved the 'nine rules,' which precluded Germany from building military aircraft. Nevertheless, the German firms of Junkers, Dornien, Rohrbach, and others, already have large aircraft construction works in Moscow, Sweden, and Copenhagen, and some at least of these are turning out military aircraft; moreover, certain types of large commercial aeroplanes are easily converted into bombing machines. Added to this, these 'nine rules' have now been relaxed, and within a space of a comparatively few years there is every probability that Germany will become a great air Power.

Although not within direct striking-distance of Britain, Russia looms in the background, a sinister, if as yet ill-defined, influence for evil; in alliance with one of the other three Powers, especially Germany, her air forces may well become an added menace to us.

The following table gives the existing strength of the air forces of Great Britain, France, and Italy:

Of the above, 32 per cent. of the British air forces are in Iraq, elsewhere in the near East, and in India; while some 25 per cent. of the French air forces are in North Africa. It is not possible to estimate Germany's potential resources, but already she has commercial aircraft capable of being rapidly converted to bombers. Russia has a programme for 1030 new aeroplanes, of which 500 are to be built at home, and 260 are to be of first-line' type. No very definite information is available as to the

* These figures include fighters, and military co-operation machines as well as long-range bombers.

progress in output, but it is very unlikely that the programme will be completed within the year.

Reviewing the position generally, it will be obvious that British Air Power is at a considerable disadvantage in comparison with France, and it also behoves us to keep a close watch on the activities of Germany and Russia. On the other hand, it is unlikely that we shall find ourselves opposed to any one of these Powers without having the active support of one of the others. Nevertheless, it must be accepted that, in the event of war with any of these continental neighbours, we may expect to find the air menace a very grave one, because Britain's vulnerable areas are so numerous and so congested that they are particularly easy targets for enemy bombers.

Another danger, which it is difficult to exaggerate, is that of air attack against our shipping. True, this form of warfare is against the spirit, if not the actual letter, of international law; but we shall be foolish indeed if we rely, once again, solely on the security of of a 'scrap of paper.' The English Channel as a waterway is indispensable to the life of the country, yet air defence for shipping in the Channel forms no part of the Air Ministry's organisation for war, nor is it the responsibility of the Admiralty.

Altogether, we must be prepared to expand and increase our air power very considerably and very rapidly if the continental air menace seems likely to develop into a definite threat to British territory and the inner seas, Here lies the real danger and the reason for an organisation which will permit of such expansion and which in other ways will meet the calls of war.

Looking farther afield, however, we find a very different state of affairs. Gibraltar and Malta, it is true, are within range of potential air attack, the former from French air forces based in North Africa, the latter from both French and Italian air forces; while our sea communications through the Mediterranean might be interfered with considerably by hostile aircraft belonging to these two Powers. It is not likely, however, that France would divert any considerable portion of her air fleet from their more obvious objective, England and

the English Channel. Italy, on the other hand, would find Mediterranean objectives far easier to reach, and might not be free to fly war aircraft over a neutral France to attack England.

Moving farther East, the possible menace to the Suez Canal and to Iraq from hostile Turkey, backed by Russia, must be borne in mind. On the north-west frontier of India, Russia, using Afghanistan as a cat's paw, is again a potential danger; but in neither case could aircraft alone achieve very much. In this connection it is necessary to differentiate clearly between the offensive powers of aeroplanes against territory with congested areas, or against massed warships or military forces, and against open and sparsely occupied territory and isolated naval or military units which can temporarily disperse or find cover. Moreover, it is as well to dispel the illusion that aeroplanes can replace ground troops in holding territory, and that this is actually being done by the Royal Air Force in Iraq to-day. The extent to which aircraft can dominate any particular locality on land or sea is dependent on the density and continuity of their attacks, and their moral effect on the defending forces or local population. Air attacks, like ships' bombardments, are necessarily spasmodic, for physical and material limitations make it impossible for them to be continuous, and even amongst races no more than semi-civilised the moral effect wears off. In practice nothing short of occupation ensures holding territory.

With regard to pretentious claims made concerning Air Force control of Iraq, it is interesting to note that whereas the actual R.A.F. flying strength in that country consists of eight squadrons of about seventy-two aeroplanes, the ground forces, in addition to the ground personnel of these squadrons, consist of:

British.

4 Armoured car companies.

1 Infantry battalion.

1 Signal section.

1 Wireless company.

1 Inland water transport detachment.

Indian.

3 Infantry battalions.

1 Company of sappers and miners.