better; he who endures them improves himself." These words of Varro, tollere et ferre, are of facetious import; but tollere seems to be used with the meaning of corrigere; for it is evident that Varro thought that the errors of a wife, if they really could not be corrected, ought to be endured, which a man may do without disgrace, for there is an important difference between errors and vices.

Complete. "Attic Nights," Book I.,
Chap. xvii.

THE REPLY OF CHRYSIPPUS TO THOSE WHO DENIED A

THEY

PROVIDENCE

HEY who think that the world was not produced on account of the Deity and of man, and deny that human affairs are governed by Providence, think that they urge a powerful argument when they assert that if there were a Providence there would be no evils. For nothing, they affirm, can be less consistent with a Providence than that in that world, on account of which the Deity is said to have created man, there should exist so great a number of calamities and evils. Chrysippus, in his fourth book concerning Providence, disputing against these, observes that nothing can be more absurd or foolish than their opinion, who think that there can be good, without the existence of evil. For as good is contrary to evil, and it is necessary that both should exist, opposite to each other, and as it were dependent upon mutual and opposite exertions, so there can be no opposing thing exist without its particular opposite. For how could there be a sense of justice, if there were no injustice? or what indeed is justice but the absence of injustice? In like manner what can we imagine of fortitude, but as opposed to pusillanimity? What of temperance, but from intemperance? What would prudence be, but for its opposite imprudence? Why also should unwise men not require this, that there should exist truth and not falsehood? In like manner exist good and evil, happiness and misery, pain and pleasure. Each, as Plato remarks, is confined to the other by contrary and opposing vortices, so that if you remove one you take away the other. This Chrysippus in the same book examines, investigates, and thinks it an important subject of inquiry, whether the imperfections of men are according to nature; that is, whether the same nature and Providence which

formed this universe and the race of men created also the defects and disorders to which men are subject. He thinks that it was not the first design of Providence to make men obnoxious to disorders, for this never could be consistent with the Author of nature and the Creator of all good things. But as, he continues, he produced and formed many and great things, most convenient and useful, there are other kindred inconveniences, adhering to the things which he created. These, he says, were not produced by nature, but by certain necessary consequences, which he denominates κατα παρακολούθησιν. Thus he remarks, when Nature creates the bodies of men, a more subtle cause, and the very usefulness of his work, required that the head should be composed of certain very minute and very delicate bones; but another external inconvenience attached to this usefulness is somewhat of more importance, that the head was less substantially defended and was liable to be broken by blows and slight resistances. In like manner disorders and sickness are obtained whilst health is

produced. And thus it is, he remarked, that when, by the purpose of Nature, virtue is created for man, defects are also at the same time produced by a contrary affinity.

Complete. "Attic Nights," Book VI.,
Chap. i

THREE REASONS ASSIGNED BY PHILOSOPHERS FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES

T IS usually supposed that there are three proper reasons for punishing crimes; the one is "admonition" when a rebuke is administered for the sake of correction and improvement, that he who has committed an accidental offense may become more regular and attentive. The second is that which they who distinguish nicely between terms call "retribution." This mode of noticing an offense takes place when the dignity and authority of him against whom it is committed is to be defended, lest the passing by the crime should give rise to contempt or a diminution of respect; therefore they suppose this word to signify the vindication of honor. The third mode of punishment is called by the Greeks napadɛtypа (example) and is applied when punishment is necessary for the sake of example, that others may be deterred from similar offenses against the public by the dread of

similar punishment. Therefore did our ancestors also denominate the heaviest and most important punishments, examples. When, therefore, there is either great hope that he who has offended will without punishment voluntarily correct himself, or, on the contrary, there is no hope that he can be amended and corrected; or that it is not necessary to fear any loss of that dignity, against which he has offended; or the offense is of that kind, the example of which it is not necessary to impress with particular terror; in this case, and with respect to every such offense, there does not seem to exist the necessity of being eager to inflict punishment. These three modes of vengeance, other philosophers in various places, and our Taurus in the first book of his Commentaries on the "Gorgias" of Plato, has set down. But Plato himself has plainly said that there only exist two causes for punishment. The one, which we have first mentioned, for correction; the other, which we have spoken of in the third place, to deter by example. These are the words of Plato: "It is proper for every one who is punished by him who punishes from a proper motive, that he should become better and receive advantage; or that he should be an example to others, that others, seeing him suffer, may from terror be rendered better."

In these lines it is evident that Plato used the word Tuwpra not, as I have before remarked some people have, but in its common and general sense, for all kinds of punishment. But whether, because he passed over as too insignificant and really contemptible, the inflicting punishment to avenge the injured dignity of man; or rather that he omitted it as not being necessary to the question he was discussing, as he was writing of punishments which were to take place not in this life among men, but after death, this I leave to others to determine.

Complete. "Attic Nights," Book VI.,
Chap. xiv.

IT

HE WHO HAS MUCH MUST NECESSARILY WANT MUCH

T IS certainly true what wise men, from their observation of the use of things, have said, that he who has much must want much, and that great indigence arises not from great want, but great abundance. For many things are wanted to preserve the many things which you have. Whoever, therefore,

having much, wishes to take care, and see beforehand that he may not want or be defective in anything, has need of loss and not of gain, and must have less that he may want less. I remember this sentiment uttered by Favorinus, amidst the loudest applauses, and conveyed in these very few words:

"He who has ten thousand or five thousand garments must inevitably want more. Wanting therefore something more than I possess, if I take away from what I have, I may content myself with the remainder."

Complete. "Attic Nights,» Book IX.,
Chap. viii.

I

THE REASON DEMOCRITUS DEPRIVED HIMSELF OF SIGHT

T IS told, in the records of Grecian history, that the philosopher Democritus, a man to be reverenced beyond all others, and of high authority, voluntarily deprived himself of sight, because he thought his contemplations and the exercises of his mind. would be more exact in examining the laws of nature, if he should free them from the allurements of sight and the burden of his eyes. The poet Laberius, in a play called "The Rector," has described in some elegant and finished verses, this fact, and the manner in which, by an ingenious contrivance, he became blind. But he has feigned another instance of voluntary blindness, and has applied it not without elegance to his own purpose. The character which speaks them in Laberius is that of a rich and covetous man, lamenting the excessive extravagance and dissipation of his son. The verses are these:

"Democritus, Abdera's far-fam'd son,

Plac'd a bright mirror 'gainst the star of day,
That his fair sight might perish by the blaze;
And thus his eyes, extinguish'd by the sun,
Might ne'er the wicked prosperous behold.
So do I with the splendor of my gold,
My life's remoter limit to obscure,
Rather than see my prodigal possess it."

Complete. "Attic Nights," Book X.,
Chap. xvii.

ON THE ABUSES OF FALSE PHILOSOPHY

LATO, a man most studious of truth, and prompt to enforce it upon all occasions, has spoken justly and openly (though from the mouth of no very grave or decorous character) all those censures which may deservedly be cast upon such sluggish and idle people, as, sheltered under the name of philosophy, devote themselves to unprofitable ease, and follow useless studies and a mean course of life. For although Callicles, whom he makes his speaker, is ignorant of true philosophy, and heaps dishonorable and degrading reproofs upon its professors, yet what he says is to be received as a caution, that we may not in our own persons deserve such reproofs, nor by idle and foolish inactivity disgrace the cultivation and pursuit of philosophy. I have written down Plato's own words in his "Gorgias," as I did not attempt to translate them, because no Latinity, much less any that I could supply, can emulate their force:

"Philosophy, O Socrates, is indeed becoming, if a man in his youth pursue it with moderation; but if he waste his time too long upon it, it is a corruptor of men, for if he be naturally good, and follow philosophy when past his youth, he is, of course, ignorant of those things in which every one should be versed who aims to be a good and accomplished character. Such are ignorant of political science, and of the language which is essential in society, both in public and private concerns; neither is he acquainted with the pleasures and desires incident to men, nor, to say the whole at once, with manners. When, therefore, they are involved in any public or private business, they appear ridiculous. Just, indeed, as men engaged in civil life, if they should enter into your schools and disputations."

What Euripides says is pertinent:

"That in which he is inferior, he avoids and dislikes; the opposite to this he praises, thinking this a proof of his complacency."

I think it best to excel in both. The pursuit of philosophy, as an accomplishment of youth, is becoming, nor is such a study by any means dishonorable for a young man. But when an older person persists in such a pursuit, it is indeed, Socrates, a ridiculous thing. I feel the same towards them who philosophize as towards them who trifle and play; and when I see a young man in whom it is yet becoming, so trifling and playing, I am pleased;