And, Mr. Chairman, when the Senate of the United States is thus about to be despoiled of its peculiar prerogative, for the accomplishment of this particular act, it may not be amiss to recall for a moment, in the language of one of the Fathers of the Constitution, the views with which that body was constituted, and that prerogative conferred upon it.

"A fifth desideratum, (said James Madison,) illustrating the utility of a Senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. An attention to the judgment of other nations, is important to every government, for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy: the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world, may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations? And how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind."

Again, says the same eminent statesman and patriot, in the same connection,

"As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind."

Such were the views with which the Senate of the United States was established, and such the views with which it was intrusted with the treaty-making power; and if there were ever an occasion which illustrated the wisdom of this feature of the Constitution, and commended it to the respect and support of all good citizens, this, this is it.

When was there ever exhibited a greater want of a due sense of national character, than in the course of this Texan negotiation? When was there ever manifested a more wanton disposition to defy the judgment of other nations, to outrage the opinion of the civilized world, and to shut the eyes to the light in

which the acts of this government must appear to the unbiased part of mankind, than in the means by which this measure has been pursued, and in the motives in which it avowedly originated? When were irregular passions, illicit advantages, and artful misrepresentations of interested men, more plainly at work than now, in stimulating the clamor with which the immediate annexation of Texas is demanded? When was the intervention of some conservative body more needed, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? Sir, these passages have seemed to me to savor of an almost prophetic application to the service which the Senate are called on to discharge at the present crisis. Let me rather say, to the service which they have already and nobly discharged, and for which that body deserves other recompense, than to be so rudely stripped of its hitherto unquestioned constitutional prerogative!

The honorable member from Alabama, (Mr. Belser,) denies, however, that this proceeding is any encroachment on the authority of the Senate, and has made an effort to produce some precedents of what he calls legislative treaties. One class of cases to which he referred was that of compacts with our own States for the cession of lands. Who can pretend that these are treaties? The whole idea of a treaty under our Constitution, as I have already proved, is a compact with a foreign power. And the States of this Union have never been called foreign in relation to the General Government, or even foreign in relation to each other, unless in certain recent resolutions of South Carolina, of which possibly something may be heard from Massachusetts hereafter, but to which I shall make no allusion now. The General Government, I presume, may purchase lands of a State, as well as of any other corporation or individual, for constitutional purposes; but such a purchase is no more a treaty in one case than in the other.

The honorable member referred us next to a law of which he was particular in giving us the volume and page. (Laws of the United States, 3d volume, page 562.) Why, Sir, this is an act for taking possession of Louisiana, after the ratification of the treaty!

His next illustration of legislative treaties was a resolution of 15th January, 1811-a resolution which was passed by both branches in secret session, and which was withheld from publication for a long period after its passage. This resolution, Mr. Chairman, contains interesting and edifying matter, and with the leave of the Committee, I will read it.

Resolution.

Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American provinces, and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the Southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce: therefore,

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory; they, at the same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands, remain subject to future negotiation."

I am at a loss to perceive, Sir, in what part of this resolution any thing of the character of a treaty is to be found, legislative or otherwise. I am glad it has been alluded to, however, as it affords the best possible illustration of what the Congress of 1811 understood by that law of necessity, that right of selfpreservation, which has been so often appealed to in justification of the measure before us. The resolution provides only for a temporary occupation of the Florida territory, and, instead of setting Spain at defiance, expressly declares that the said territory shall remain subject to future negotiation.

But the honorable member from Alabama alluded, lastly, to cases of commercial regulation. These cases undoubtedly are somewhat peculiar in their character, but they are clearly distinguishable from treaties. Congress, in the passage of such acts, undertakes to do nothing to which the consent of another government is necessary. We impose certain duties, for instance, or open certain ports, conditionally upon the action of foreign governments. We can impose the same duties, or open the same ports, without any such condition. We can make the same regulations, subject to any other condition of time or of circumstance, as well as subject to the legislation of a foreign

government. The concurrent or reciprocal legislation of another nation is a mere motive, in view of which we proceed to pass acts to which we are entirely competent of ourselves, which operate only within our own boundaries, and which the consent of no other party is necessary to complete. The whole doctrine of the distinction between the legislative and the treaty-making power, however, has been laid down by the present Secretary of State with so much precision and power, that I will detain the Committee no longer upon it myself, but will proceed to read some extracts of the speech of Mr. Calhoun on the commercial treaty with Great Britain, in the House of Representatives, January 8, 1816. (See Elliott's Debates, vol. iv. p. 273.)

"He would establish, he trusted, to the satisfaction of the House, that the treatymaking power, when it was legitimately exercised, always did that which could not be done by law."

He acknowledged, with the
The reason is plain; one

It required a contract

Why cannot Congress make peace? They have the power to make war. Why cannot Congress, then, repeal the act making war? gentleman, they cannot consistently with reason. power may make war; it requires two to make peace. or a treaty between the nations at war. Is this peculiar to a treaty of peace? No; it is common to all treaties. It arises out of their nature, and not from any incidental circumstance attaching itself to a particular class. It is no more nor less than that Congress cannot make a contract with a foreign nation. . . . Whenever, then, an ordinary subject of legislation can only be regulated by contract, it passes from the sphere of the ordinary power of making laws, and attaches itself to that of making treaties, wherever it is lodged. .. Whatever, then, concerns our foreign relations, whatever requires the consent of another nation, belongs to the treaty power; can only be regulated by it; and it is competent to regulate all such subjects, provided —and here are its true limits — such regulations are not inconsistent with the Constitution. It has for its object, contracts with foreign nations; as the powers of Congress have for their object whatever can be done in relation to the powers delegated to it without the consent of foreign nations. Each in its proper sphere operates with genial influence; but when they become erratic, then they are portentous and dangerous. A treaty never can legitimately do that which can be done by law; and the converse is also true. Suppose the discriminating duties repealed on both sides by law, yet what is effected by this treaty would not even then be done; the plighted faith would be wanting. Either side might repeal its law without a breach of contract. It appeared to him that gentlemen are too much influenced on this subject, by the example of Great Britain. Instead of looking to the nature of our government, they have been swayed in their opinion by the practice of that government, to which we are but too much in the habit of looking for precedents."

But we are now told, Mr. Chairman, that Texas was once a part of our own territory, ceded to us by France in 1803; that

this is, therefore, no question of original annexation; that we are only about to reclaim and reannex it. Sir, we have often heard of the magic power of words before now, but the question before us will be a lasting illustration of the mightier magic of syllables. There were two editions of a memorable letter to the people of Carroll county, Kentucky, published last Spring; the first was a letter relative to the annexation of Texas; the second was a letter relative to the re-annexation of Texas. They were published within a few weeks of each other, and prove how much importance is attached to this mono-syllabic after-thought. O, Sir, if the friends of this measure had exhibited half as much of the "suaviter in modo," as they have of the "fortiter in RE," it would have been better, far better for the honor of our country.

But my hour is on the point of expiring, and I must leave all further remark upon the subject to another opportunity. I rejoice to believe that this is not the last time of asking in relation to this abhorrent union, and that we are not called on to declare our objections to it now, under the penalty of forever afterwards holding our peace. Meantime, circumstances may have changed before the measure is presented to us again. It may come before the country in a more constitutional shape. It may involve less danger of war. It may involve less encroachment on the rights of others. Objections of a temporary and formal character may have been removed. But I am unwilling to resume my seat without saying, that no such change of circumstances will alter the case for me. I am against annexation, now and always

Because I believe it to be clearly unconstitutional in substance;

Because I believe it will break up the balance of our system, violate the compromises of the Constitution, and endanger the permanence of our Union;

And, above all, because I am uncompromisingly opposed to the extension of Domestic Slavery, or to the addition of another inch of Slaveholding Territory to this Nation.