adopted in his hatband, to petition against ship-money, and to demand the release from imprisonment of their gallant and glorious Representative; days, when fifteen thousand women, headed by the wife of an honest brewer, were seen wending their way with a petition to the very doors of the House of Commons; and when those doors were thrown open to receive them! And what was the moral of those scenes? Sir, in those days the champions of the popular cause relied greatly on the exercise of this right of petition to strengthen them in their struggles against the encroachments and exactions of the Crown. Petitions to the Parliament and petitions to the King were then among the most important instruments of the popular movement. There was even a time when the friends of freedom assumed the party name of Petitioners, and when the friends of prerogative and power were known by the name of Abhorrers-abhorrers of petitions! and these names of Petitioners and Abhorrers were as common and as general as Whig and Tory afterwards were, and designated respectively the same party divisions. And there is one little anecdote of those days, which I cannot forbear reciting with greater exactness. It is the anecdote of a man, whose real name is not recorded on the page of history, but who gave a name to himself which will not soon be forgotten; a man who seems to have foreshadowed something of the indomitable spirit on the subject of the right of petition, which has been so often manifested on this floor by my honored and venerable colleague (Mr. Adams ;) a man who went in person into the very presence of King Charles I., and presented to him a petition, complaining of some act of oppression and demanding redress. "How dare you," said the King, "present me such a petition?" "May it please your Majesty," said the man, “my name is Dare." He was rewarded for his boldness, not as my venerable colleague was on a well-remembered occasion, by a resolution of censure or impeachment, (telum imbelle, sine ictu !) but by a heavy fine and a long-continued imprisonment. If I remember right, Sir, the first child born in the Jamestown colony was christened "Virginia Dare," and perhaps the name was in honor of this stout and sturdy old upholder of the right of petition! This supposition, however, would involve a slight ana

chronism, I fear, and must therefore be abandoned. I fear still more that most of the Dare family of Virginia of the present day would be disposed to renounce and disown such a namesake.

But these historical reminiscences, pertinent as they are, do not come near enough to the point, to answer the purpose of my argument; and I proceed to cite a case which will more clearly sustain the exact positions I have laid down.

In the year 1668, one Mr. Thomas Skinner presented a petition to the British House of Lords, complaining of certain oppressive acts of the East India Company. These acts were properly cognizable, it would seem, by the ordinary courts of law. But the Lords, notwithstanding, determined to assume jurisdiction, and decide upon them for themselves. The East India Company thereupon presented a petition to the House of Commons, complaining of the House of Lords, and denying their right to proceed in the premises. The Lords immediately took umbrage at this petition, as libellous and scandalous, as a breach of their privilege and an encroachment upon their prerogative, and proceeded to punish Sir Samuel Bernardiston and other members of the company by fine and imprisonment. A long and angry dispute forthwith arose between the two branches of Parliament on this particular point :- how far petitions which were presented in the House of Commons could be taken notice of in the House of Lords or elsewhere; and, in the course of this dispute, the right of petition generally underwent a strict and thorough investigation. Elaborate reports were made on both sides, and sundry resolutions were adopted. I find no detailed record of the reports, but among the resolutions adopted by the Commons were the following:

"That it is an inherent right of every commoner of England to prepare and present petitions to the House of Commons, in case of grievances, and of the House of Commons to receive the same."

"It hath been always, time out of mind, the constant and uncontroverted usage and custom of the House of Commons to have petitions presented to them from commoners, in case of grievance, public or private; in evidence whereof, it is one of the first works that is done by the House of Commons, to appoint a Grand Committee to receive petitions and informations of grievances."

"In case men should be punishable in other courts for preparing and presenting petitions for redress of grievances to the House of Commons, it may discourage and

deter His Majesty's subjects from seeking redress of their grievances, and by that means frustrate the main and principal end for which Parliaments were ordained."

Sir, what fuller evidence could be given, what stronger testimony adduced, of the importance which was attached in those early days to this inherent right of petition, or of the inviolable sanctity which belonged to it? What significance there is in the fact here stated, that "it is one of the first works that is done by the House of Commons, to appoint a grand committee to receive petitions and informations of grievances!" What an emphasis in the idea that "it may discourage and deter His Majesty's subjects from seeking redress of their grievances, and by that means frustrate the main and principal end for which Parliaments were ordained!" I imagine that no gentleman will desire further evidence as to the first proposition which I undertook to establish.

But where is the evidence that our fathers regarded this right of petition in the same light? Why, Sir, it so happens that in the Congress of 1789, by which the amendments to the Constitution were agreed upon, this first article of amendment, which is in controversy in this debate, was the subject of some discussion. The adoption of it was opposed by some of the members of that Congress. But on what grounds was it opposed? Was it on the idea which has been held out in this debate, that it would be unbecoming in a free and sovereign people to present themselves in the attitude of petitioners to this House? Was it on the ground that the right of petition was not an American right, as was suggested by a gentleman from Pennsylvania, I think, during the last Congress? No. Our fathers of that day were fresh from the great conflicts and controversies of the Revolution, and they understood what American rights were, too well to broach such an idea as that. It was opposed on the ground that the right of petition already existed, and needed no new assertion. It was said that it was 66 a self-evident, inalienable right, which the people possessed." It was said that "it would never be called in question." While, on the other hand, it was contended by the advocates of the amendment, that, although it was "an inherent, existing right," it would be well, from its very value, to give it the additional force and solemnity of a constitutional sanction.

"The committee who framed this report (said Mr. Benson) proceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to the people. They conceived them to be inherent, and all that they meant to provide against was their being infringed by the govern ment."

Need I add any thing more, Sir, on the second proposition which I undertook to maintain?

Let me hasten, then, to the principle of reception, and to those instances of refusal to receive, which have been cited by the honorable member from Alabama.

And first let me bring to the notice of the House a fact of no little significance upon this point of my argument, which I find in the history of the East India Company case, already referred to. Among the other resolutions reported to the House of Commons on that occasion, was one in these words:

"That it is the undoubted right and privilege of the House of Commons to judge and determine touching the nature and matter of such petitions, how far they are fit or unfit to be received."

I can imagine, Mr. Speaker, the triumphant tone in which this resolution would have been introduced to the notice of the House, had it fallen under the eye of any one of the advocates of the rule under debate. I confess that, at first, I was not a little perplexed by it myself. True, it was open to the remark, that it was reported in the spirit of a protest against the assumption of the House of Lords; and the other resolutions, by which it was preceded and followed, gave ample reason for believing, that it was only designed to deny the right of any body but themselves, to judge as to petitions presented to the Commons, how far they were fit or unfit to be received. Still, the language of the resolution, as I have read it, is certainly not quite consistent with the doctrines I have undertaken to establish; and I plainly perceive the satisfaction with which it has been heard in some quarters of the House. But what will gentlemen say when they learn that before this resolution was adopted, the word "received" was stricken out, upon formal motion, and the word "retained" inserted in its place! This, Sir, is the fact. Here is the record of it.* And no better proof could be fur nished than is found in this deliberate change of phraseology,

*See note on page 411.

that those who made it were unwilling, after asserting so emphatically the inherent right of every commoner of England to present petitions, to abridge and even annihilate that right in the next breath, by arrogating to themselves an unlimited right of judgment, how far these petitions were fit or unfit to be received. They claimed only the right to judge how far they were fit to be retained; and to retain, I need not say, ex vi termini, implies reception.

But how is it with the examples which have been cited of a direct refusal to receive in later days, and with the standing rules of the House of Commons under which these examples have occurred?

It is true, Sir, that two rules of this character were adopted by that body more than a century ago. One of them to the effect, "that they would receive no petitions against a bill, actually pending, for imposing taxes or duties." The other, "that they would receive no petitions for grants or appropriations of money relating to public service not recommended by the Crown." Now, these are the only rules of the kind which have ever been known to the parliamentary proceedings of England; and all the cases in which petitions, respectful in their terms, have been refused a reception, are found to be ranged under the authority of these two rules. And how am I to substantiate my position, that these rules are exceptions to the general principles and general practice of Parliament, and furnish no justification of the rule of this House? I shall summon to my aid, for this purpose, the great authority upon all questions of parliamentary proceeding, Mr. Hatsell; from whose well-known work Mr. Jefferson compiled his Manual, and to whom the highest acknowledgments are paid in the preface to that Manual. Let Mr. Hatsell explain these rules, and the reasons of them, in his own words, and then let us hear what he has to say in addition :

"We see from the foregoing instances, particularly from the precedents which are cited, and read on the 10th of April, 1733, that very soon after the Revolution, the House found it necessary to establish a rule, "that they would not receive any petition against a bill, then depending, for imposing a tax or duty." The principle upon which this rule was adopted appears to be this, — that a tax generally extending in its effect over every part of the kingdom, and more or less affecting every individual, and in its nature necessarily and intentionally imposing a burden upon the people, it can answer