already appropriated them to almost every object that can be named, to education, to internal improvements, to charity, to the use of individuals, of corporations, and of States.

And there is as little, Mr. Chairman, in the reason of the thing as there is in the language of the Constitution, for limiting the disposition of the moneys received from the sales of the public lands. The people may well be jealous of intrusting even their own representatives with the power of taxing them for every purpose at their pleasure. But, as I have already said, the sales of the public lands involve no taxation; they impose no burdens upon anybody. In regard to them, therefore, the people are entirely safe in giving us the full latitude of a sound and reasonable discretion. And such a discretion, I hold, they have given us. But gentlemen tell us that inasmuch as the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands will involve the necessity of laying additional taxes on imports, it amounts to the same thing as distributing the receipts from taxation. Why, Sir, the same reasoning might almost as well be adduced against appropriating the Smithsonian fund to the object for which it was designed. That fund, if applied to the ordinary expenditures of the government, would save the necessity of raising an equal amount by taxation. And its appropriation to the diffusion of useful knowledge among mankind, according to the terms of the bequest, might, with almost as much justice, be complained of as involving the necessity of imposing additional burdens on the people, as the distribution for which this bill provides; if, as I maintain, the proceeds of the public lands constitute a separate fund in the Treasury, entirely distinguishable from the ordinary revenues of the country.

Again, Sir, it has been suggested that, upon this principle, the national government might do to almost any extent indirectly, that which it is admitted they have no power to do directly. They might tax the people, we are told, to almost any amount for the purchase of new lands, and then go on to sell them forthwith and distribute the proceeds. But it is to be observed, Mr. Chairman, in the first place, that such an abuse would have its origin in the power to purchase, and not in the power to distriAnd the power to purchase new territory, we all know,

bute.

is one of very questionable constitutionality. The honorable member from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ingersoll) the other day alluded to my respected colleague in front of me, (Mr. Adams,) as hav. ing denied the constitutionality of the Louisiana purchase. My colleague was not alone in that denial. Mr. Jefferson himself, in a letter to Mr. Breckenridge, written at the time, expressly declared that the Executive, in making that purchase, “had done an act beyond the Constitution."

But even were it not so, even were the power of purchasing territory entirely indisputable and unlimited, what would this suggestion amount to, but to one of those arguments against the use or existence of a power from its liability to abuse, which may be brought alike against any and every branch of authority which the Constitution bestows? Sir, if such arguments are to have weight, we must revoke all authority, renounce all government, abandon all society. Every power may be abused, and the only check or safeguard we can have is in the responsibility of those to whom power is intrusted.

I hold, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that there is a plain and palpable distinction between the proceeds of the public lands and the other receipts into the Treasury of the nation, and that while the latter are limited to certain specified objects of appropriation, the former are placed freely, so far at least as the Constitution is concerned, at the discretion of Congress,- a discretion only controlled by the responsibility of those who exercise it to the people who elected them.

And, indeed, this doctrine has too often been admitted, as serted, and acted upon, even by those who have been the most strenuous opponents of this measure of distribution, to require any more extended illustration. It was expressly asserted by General Jackson, as long ago as 1832. In his Annual Message of that year, he says,

"As the lands may now be considered as relieved from this pledge (the payment of the public debt,) the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished, it is in the discretion of Congress to dispose of them in such way as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general interest of the American people."

The same doctrine has been admitted, or certainly implied,

by all the friends of cession, as it is called, whether absolute or conditional, from that day to this. For on what principle could Congress cede away the whole or any part of the lands themselves, which does not imply a high and plenary discretion on their part to dispose of the proceeds also?

I turn, then, Mr. Chairman, from this first point in my argument, to inquire what considerations should influence us in the exercise of this discretion, and, more especially, what considerations will justify us in the particular exercise of it which is now proposed.

And, first, I maintain that Congress is not bound in such a case to look altogether to the necessities of the National Treasury. This would be to destroy the whole effect of the distinction just established, and practically to place the proceeds of the public lands on the same footing with any other description of income. We may take a larger and more liberal view of things. We may look, and we ought to look, to considerations of equity, to considerations of expediency, to considerations commensurate with the whole country, or, as General Jackson said, with “the quiet, harmony, and general interest of the American people."

Why, Sir, even in relation to the ordinary revenues of the country, the wants of the government are not always exclusively regarded. What would be the conduct of Congress at the present session in relation to what is called the compromise act, if the necessities of the nation were to be the only rule of action? Under the provisions of that act, five millions of dollars are to be withdrawn from the annual revenues of the country, at a moment when, as I have said, there is already a debt and deficiency of twelve millions. We are about to give a silent assent, by leaving that act in operation and laying new duties at the same time, to a course of proceeding by no means remotely analogous, and to my mind, quite as objectionable, abstractly considered, as that now under discussion. We are about to remit duties with one hand, while we collect them with the other. Upon what principle will this be done? Why, upon the principle of a previous compact, an existing understanding, or a high and eminent expediency. For myself, I take leave to say, I admit no compact. Those whom I have the honor to represent

were not parties to any compact. Nor can I regard it as eminently expedient, either, to pursue such a course. On the contrary, I am disposed to think that, as an abstract question of policy and statesmanship, the best way of supplying the exist ing deficiency in the Treasury would be to suspend the operation of the compromise act, and lay duties on a few only of the leading articles of import, instead of deranging the operations of the whole business community by a sudden imposition of twenty per cent. ad valorem on every article of commerce which is now free, and that as a temporary expedient. But this I well know is out of the question. I allude to the subject only for illustration. The act will be carried out. Duties to the amount of five millions will be taken off, and new duties to the amount of twelve millions will be imposed. And this will be done, as I have said, on some grounds of compact, understanding, or expediency.

Well, Sir, and are there no such grounds for the measure we are now discussing? Is there no compact in the case, no expediency, no equity?

I will not go into an elaborate history of the public lands of the United States to show my understanding of the terms on which the original cession of a large portion of them was made by the States. That history is familiar to the House and to the country. Those terms have been argued again and again, not only in these halls, but in the halls of every Legislature throughout the country. I shall content myself with saying in the most general terms, on this head, that, while I cannot go the length of declaring, that the appropriation of the proceeds of the public lands to the ordinary purposes of government would be an absolute violation of the compact, I have yet no hesitation in affirming that, in my humble judgment, a distribution of those proceeds among the States would be far more in accordance both with the letter and the spirit of that compact.

I am willing to admit, however, that, as to the intention and contemplation of the States at the time these cessions were made, I think very little can be safely or certainly argued. The contemplation of the States could not have reached to a day like this. High as were the hopes, sanguine as were the expecta

tions, of our fathers at that time, as to the glorious results of the liberty they had achieved and the institutions they had established, it never could have entered into their hearts to conceive of a condition of the country, in which the public debt being all paid off, such countless acres of territory should remain as the rich and unencumbered inheritance of their children. These cessions certainly were made with no regard to such a state of things. They were made with a view to the present, and not to the future. They were made to allay the jealousies and settle the contentions to which the exclusive claims of certain separate States had given rise, and to defray the expenses which their common independence had cost.

The argument in favor of this measure, from the terms of cession, however, covers only the lands which were ceded. I am aware it is sometimes contended that the lands subsequently purchased may be considered as having been purchased with the proceeds of those ceded, and may thus be made subject to the same principle of disposition. But I prefer, for myself, to rely on considerations which are directly and equally applicable to the whole domain.

I come, then, to some explanation of those considerations of eminent expediency, which in my judgment, should induce us to exercise the discretionary authority we unquestionably possess over the proceeds of the public lands in the manner pointed out by the bill; namely, by distributing them among the States, instead of retaining them to eke out the scanty contents of our own Treasury.

And I have no hesitation in saying, Mr. Chairman, that I find these considerations exclusively in the situation of some of the States of this Union. There is no feature in the condition of the country, lamentable as that condition is in so many respects, which is calculated to excite such serious apprehension for its prosperity and its honor, as the deep indebtedness of so many of the States. Sir, we may not assume their debts, directly or indirectly. We have no constitutional power to do so. But we may do something, and by this bill we should do something, to aid, encourage, and sustain them in their efforts to relieve themselves. And whatever we can do constitutionally, we are