1. εἰσηγουμένη, πρεσβεύουσα, ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν συντιθεμένη. ac similiter in eadem dixit, οἷς εὖ τίθεται τὸ παρόν. τ corrumpitur in δ, et contra.—Scribendum igitur τρώσει pro δρώσει lib. v. cap. 29. ex Eurip. Contra δράσης pro τρώσης ibid. ex eod. . in S, et contra, et in μ. Scribendum igitur μετην pro μεθῆν Aristid. extrema Platon. 2. ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ γέ μοι καὶ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ μεθῆν ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ. κατάραι pro καθάραι lib. iv. cap. 13. ex Apollod. Contra αὖθις pro αὐτῆς Din. κατὰ δημοσθ. et Polyb. 4. αὐθῶν pro αὐτῶν in Athen. fragm. Mutationis hujus originem supra paucis indicavi: quæ quidem etiam in priore locum potest habere. Der in dixi. τ in r, et contra.Scribendum igitur τῷ] pro σῷ Aristid. initio Serm. 1. εἰ καὶ τῷ ὄντι τοῦτ ̓ ἐπεπόνθειν. εὐεργετών pro εὐεργεσιών de Paraph. Contra ἠσίτησα] pro ἠσίτητα Aristid. Serm. 1. εὐθύς είχον ἐν νῷ, ὡς δια τελέσων ἄσιτος τὴν ἡμέραν ἠσίτητα δή. σώσειν pro τώσει» Dinarch. κατὰ δημοσθ. Heic etiam forte vicinitas, velut in x et a, mendo causam dedit. v corrumpitur in et contra, et in η, .-Scribendum et s, et i, et n.α, igitur θύσειν pro θήσειν Aristid. Serm. 4. ὅτι μέλλοιεν θήσειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ δημοσία. ὕσθημεν pro ήσθημεν Serm. 2. ν pro ή de Societ. 2. ὡς τὰ τῆς ἀττικῆς βοσκήματα εἰς τὴν βοιωτίαν ἤ ἄξει. ἐστυκότες pro ἑστηκότες lib. v. cap. 3. ex Aristoph. Contra πέφηνεν] pro πέφυκεν Aristid. Platon. 1. εἰ μὲν πέφυκεν, ὥστε ὑβριστὰς καὶ κόλακας ποιεῖν. (et Herod. περὶ πολιτ.) et mox pro πέφυνεν. Jam ὑμῖν et ἡμῖν, ὑμέτερα et ημέτερα millies inter se commutantur. De v in a, et in e diximus : nec non de v in i, et in v. ον in w. Scribendum igitur συνθεὶς] pro σωθεὶς Aristid. initio Palinod. ἕως ἔλαθον λόγους τινὰς σωθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. Pertinent huc ὑπὲς et ὑπὸ, sæpe locum non suum, sæpe suum non occupantia. • corrumpitur in v. Scribendum igitur λόφου pro λόγου Arist. extremo Serm. 3. ἐν κορυφῇ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἄτυος. φ in m, et in v. Scribendum igitur ἀφεῖσαν] pro ἀνεῖσαν Aristid. Platon. 2. τὸ μὲν ταύτα τοῖς προτέροις ἀγγέλοις παθεῖν διὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς προξενίας ἀνεῖσαν. scribendum quoque φόνους] pro πόνους Hel. 1. χρὴ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερα τραύματα καὶ πόνους ἴσους είναι παρεσκευασμένους. x corrumpitur in u, et contra, et in v. Scribendum igitur χαίρειν pro καλεῖν Aristid. de Paraph. καλεῖν κελεύων τοὺς προσαγωγέας. ἐπιχωρήσαν τις] pro ἐπικουρήσαντες in fin. Platon. 2. ἀλλ ̓ ἐπικουρήσαντες τῷ θεῷ τὴν κρίσιν. χερί pro κίας lib. vi. cap. 13. ex Eurip. Contra κύπρις pro χάρις lib. eod. cap. 19. ex eod. et cap. 23. εκόντες pro ἔχοντες ex eod. et Polyb. 17. De x in y dixi. χ in a, et contra.Scribendum igitur σκηπτούχων] pro σκηπτούλων Aristid. extrema Plat. 2. ἀλλ ̓ οἷς τοῦτο προσήκει τῶν σκηπτούλων, καὶ οἵτινες ἂν γνωρίζωσι τὰ λεγόμενα. χαβρίας pro λαβρίας Din. κατὰ δημοσθ. Contra καπήλοις pro καπήχεις Alcidam. κατὰ παλαμήδι μέτρα γὰρ καὶ σταθμὰ ἐξεῦρε καπήχεις καὶ ἀγοραίοις ἀνθρώποις. Χ in ", et contra.Scribendum igitur είχε] pro εἶναι Aristid. in Panath. ἃ καὶ ὀνόματι γνωρίσαι φιλοτιμίαν εἶναι. Contra κινησίαν pro κιχησίαν Aristid. bis, Platon. 2. + corrumpitur in ξ.—Scribendum igitur ἐπιρρίψαις pro ἐπιρρήξαις Aristi. in Put. Ascul. εἰ ἐπιρρήξαις αὐτῷ ὕδωρ ἕτερον, ἀντάνοισιν εἰς τὸ ἄνω. ὑπολείψεις pro ὑποδείξεις lib. 5. cap. 27. e Plut. a corrumpitur in a.-Scribendum igitur T] pro T Aristid. in Panegyr. πόρρω pro παρὰ Platon. 1. καὶ ὁ τότ ̓ ἦν παρὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τοῦτ ̓ εἰκάσαι τῷ λογισμῷ. λαβώμενοι pro λαβόμενοι lib. i. cap. 9. ex Eurip. ω in n, et contra - Scribendum igitur σταφίδων] pro σταφίδην Aristid. Sermon. 2. Contra vμény] pro vμ Aristid. Platon. 1. Cýrnaly τοῦ μέλλοντος διώτε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων. διηρημένης pro διηρημένως in Panat. w in si, et contra.—Scribendum igitur παρακολουθῶν] pro παρακολου θεῖν Aristid. de Paraph. ἀλλὰ καίπως παρακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ὅμηρος. παραλείπων] pro παραλιπείν in Panath. ἐγχωρείν] pro ἐγχειρείν Leuctr. 5. Contra εὐδοκιμεῖν] pro εὐδοκιμών Aristid. initio Platon. 2. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο μειζόνως εὐδοκιμῶν αὐτῷ προσήκεν. w in του, et contra. — Scribendum igitur λέγωσιν] pro λέγουσιν Aristid. initio. Contra prodit. ἂν δὲ φωράση τις, ἔχωσιν ἀναχώρησιν, καὶ λέγουσιν. ὁμοίως pro ὁμοίους 1. de Concord. Contra δήπου] pro δήπω Aristid. in Rom. οὐ δήπω πλουσίῳ μὲν μᾶλλον, πένητι δὲ ἧττον χαριζόμενον. Atque hæc hactenus. 1 ILLUSTRATIONS OF HOMER. NO. II. TO THE EDITOR OF THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL. SIR, IN a late Number I presumed very respectfully to show, that Heyne and Professor Porson were mistaken in their construction of Il. 1. 282. On this attempt one of your learned correspondents thus animadverts: "Your correspondent," says he, "appears to us to be a man of more learning than judgment. His remarks are such as find fault merely to contradict, and censure only to differ from men of eminent talents and acquirements. His lucubrations display such a propensity to oppose standard authority, that we are almost induced to apply to him the character drawn by an eloquent historian, Nulla ingenia tam prona ad invidiam sunt, quam eorum qui genus ac fortunam suain animis non æquant: quia virtutem et bonum alienum oderunt." A little after, speaking of Porson's note, he adds, "This exquisite note of the Professor, we should have thought, might have served as a scourge to grovelling critics, and have swept them from the view as the Dunciad cleared the garrets of Grub-street." I have received the same rude treatment from a man who calls himself a Professor of Greek in Edinburgh. I here quote a part of his language: "The great names of Stephen, Brunck, and Heyne deserve somewhat more respect, and are intitled to more authority, than the Illustrator of Homer seems disposed to allow them. But when he next attempts to set up his own opinion against theirs, he must rest more upon fact than vague notions, if he expect to obtain any credit. Of late, indeed, particularly since Porson's death, a swarm of critics have arisen, destitute of his sagacity, memory, and judgment, who whenever · they find a passage somewhat obscure, fasten on it with avidity, and new model it according to their own crude notions. In the present state of criticism, conjecture is too often substituted for certainty, and rash opinions for cautious suggestions; to the discredit of the art itself, and the manifest injury of those ancient monuments of wisdom and genius, too sacred and valuable to be patched up by every pretender to literature." I wish my readers to notice this abuse, and call it to mind when I come to the close of my argument; they will then, I trust, see reason to conclude, that it recoils on its authors: and this conclusion is the only revenge which is worthy of me to seek. I shall again beg to quote the lines in question: ̓Ατρείδη, σὺ δὲ παυε τεὸν μένος, αὐτὰς ἔγωγε Il. 1. 282. Now my position is, that the sense in which Porson, Heyne, Brunck, and I may add Wolf, understand this passage, is not the true one: that on the other hand, the true, is the previously received, sense. My reasons for the assertion, that Porson is mistaken, are the following: 1. The Greek and Latin writers seldom use the possessive pronouns, their place being supplied by the context. On the other hand, they necessarily use those pronouns, when any opposition is intended. Nestor here addressing Atrides does not say μένος, but τεὸν μένος, ΤΗ anger; and therefore he intends to contrast the anger of Agamennon with xónov 'Ax in the ensuing clause. But according to Porson's χόλον interpretation, both words describe the same idea, namely, the wrath of Atrides. 2. It was obvious from the circumstances of the case, that the object of Agamemnon's anger was Achilles. If, therefore, the Professor be right, the term 'Aï in the last clause was unnecessary, and it would have been sufficient for Nestor to say λίσσομαι χόλον μεθέμεν, Achilles being obviously understood to be the person whom that anger regarded. 3. Porson's construction supposes that pivos and λ mean the same or nearly the same thing, as being descriptive only of the resentment of Agamemnon. But the supposition is erroneous, and is unworthy of the acuteness and learning of that great critic. The former of these terms is often taken in a good sense, as denoting courage or strength of mind; and here it designates that species of deliberate and more dignified resentment, which was consistent with the commander-inchief: on the other hand 20s means that rage or fury, which was characteristic of Achilles. Homer has preserved the two characters throughout very distinct. Agamemnon, though not just and wise, is ever sedate and decorous: while we see the son of Peleus transported with ungoverned rage and disgraced with foul language. Our poet therefore usually applies λos, as peculiarly suited to Achilles; nor is the word at all used in regard to Atrides, except when used by an enemy, and used in order to aggravate or distort his passion. See II. i. 81, 381. Il. iv. 178. Can we then suppose that Nestor, when now addressing Agamemnon, should use the word to his face? Could he be so impolite or imprudent as to endeavor to allay the feelings of the king by a term, which was rather calculated to irritate them? 4. According to Professor Dunbar, avràg means transition and seldom opposition, and he renders it in addition; while my Cambridge Adversary has discovered that it means then, or in the next place. Let us then insert this acceptation in the disputed passage. "Do thou restrain thy anger, THEN or in the next place I supplicate thee to dismiss thy rage towards Achilles." So Nestor first commands Agamemnon to restrain his anger; and when that is done, he supplicates him to do it. This meaning may be very worthy of such writers as my adversaries; but I am sure it is unworthy of Porson and of every other man of sense. Now I propose to show that aurag has no such meaning as then or in addition; that in every instance where it occurs, and it occurs frequently, it implies opposition-opposition between two ideas expressed, or between one idea expressed and another not expressed, but predominant in the mind of the writer. The merits of this dispute turn considerably on the use of this word; and if my assertion be true, the hypothesis of Mr. Dunbar, and of your Correspondent, falls to the ground. On this subject they both assume lofty and magisterial airs, and betray the usual effect of mistaken confidence. Αὐτὰς ὁ μακρὰ βοῶν ̓Αγαμέμνονα νείκες μύθῳ. H. ii. 222. In this instance the opposition marked by aurag is clearly expressed in words. The Greeks were indignant at Agamemnon; but they had the good sense and decency to confine their indignation to their own bosom: but Thersites reproached him aloud, and in words. In line 405. of the same book, Agamemnon invites the chiefs to his feast: Νέστορα μὲν, πρώτιστα, καὶ ̓Ιδομενῆα ἄνακτα, Now, if either of my adversaries were asked what is the meaning of aurag in this place, they would confidently answer, it implies transition, not opposition-and should be rendered by and or in addition, after that. On the other hand, I maintain that, as in the former it means opposition, it has the same meaning in this, with this difference, that one of the ideas opposed or contrasted is not expressed, but nevertheless predominant in the mind of the poet, and which he knew would suggest itself to every reader properly acquainted with the subject. Ajax and Diomedes, on account of their superior prowess, were intitled to precede Idomeneus at the feast. The reader, therefore, might expect them to be invited before him. Of this expectation the poet was aware; he therefore precludes it, by saying that Agamemnon invited the two Ajaxes and Tydides not before Idomeneus, BUT after him. This chief however excelled them in regal diguity, and Homer has annexed avaxтa to suggest the grounds of Agamemnon's preference. The ideas contrasted or opposed by aurag are, as I have said, often expressed, but most commonly one of them is implied; and it must be sought in the context; in the views and feelings of the poet, in order to be brought to light. This is the true key to unfold the meaning of aurap on every occasion. In the course of the Iliad and Odyssey, it occurs, I should suppose, many hundred times; and it bears invariably the same deter minate sense. I will however not dismiss this part of the subject, without corroborating my assertion by a few more examples. When Paris advanced in front of the Trojans, and approached the Grecian chiefs, the poet says of him 'ΑΥΤΑΡ ὁ δοῦμε δύω κεκορυθμένα χαλκῷ Πάλλων ̓Αργείων προκαλίζετο πάντας αρίστους. Il. iii. 18. Here the reader might expect that this effeminate warrior, on seeing the Grecian heroes advancing against him, should have shrunk back, appalled with terror and guilt. This expectation the poet meets, and says "BUT he, brandishing his spears, challenged all the chiefs." As though he had said- No, Paris did not start back at the sight of them, BUT challenged them all, and started back with alarm only when he saw Menelaus.' Prœtus sent Bellerophon to the king of Lycia with letters requesting that the bearer should be destroyed. 'Opg' amoλoiro. But the poet adds, ΑΥΤΑΡ ὁ βῆ Λυκίηνδε θεῶν ὑπ' ἀμύμονι πομπή. II. vi. 171. The ideas of the poet drawn out in full are the following, Bellerophon did go to Lycia, but was not destroyed, being aided by the gods who accompanied him." I allow, indeed, that aurag has sometimes the sense of de; but never unless this last expresses opposition. It also occasionally supplies the use of daλd, when it serves to contrast the clause succeeding it with a negative idea implied in the preceding. Thus Telemachus says, Od. xv. 159. that, if on his return he should find his father, he would tell him, ὡς παρὰ σεῖο τυχὼν φιλότητος ἁπάσης, Ερχομαι 'ΑΥΤΑΡ ἄγω κειμήλια, that is, ἔρχομαι οὐ μόνον τυχῶν φιλότητος, ἀλλὰ ἄγω κειμήλια. "I come having received not only every kind attention from Nestor, while in his house, BUT I also bring rich presents." This last is the sense, which αὐτὰρ bears in Od. vii. 121. Ὄγχνη, ἐπὶ ἔγχνη γηράσκει αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ σταφυλῇ σταφυλή— Not only pears grow old upon pears, BUT also grapes upon grapes." Heyne, who says that aurag has in the disputed verse merely the force of a copulative, refers to these two last instances as meaning vero, et præterea. But in these references he is plainly mistaken; and equally mistaken is he as to the signification of aurag in the controverted line. My Cambridge adversary has quoted II. i. 457, &c. where the word occurs four times, to show that it means then, after that. I shall examine only the first : αὐτὰς ἐπεὶ ρ' εὔξαντο—ἔρυσαν, &c. They turned the victims upward, BUT after they had prayed:" in other words, "They turned the victims upward, not before, but after they had prayed." How then could our critic infer, that it here means then? If the negative idea to which ard refers be overlooked, it becomes then a useless word, and might well be omitted in a version otherwise not unfaithful. Thus, "When they prayed they turned the victims upward." Or if a translator wished to be emphatic, he might say, "When they prayed, then they turned the victims upward." But here is a double departure from the original: first, the antithesis |