with the English Admiral, was to intercept a fecond convoy from Breft, which failed from that place on the 11th of February, in order to supply the failure of the former, and was conveying naval ftores, artillery, ammunition, and all other fupplies to the Count de Graffe, which were either neceffary for the prefent repair and fitting out of his fleet, or for the further fupport and execution of the great object he had in view. For this purpose he difpofed of his fleet in a line to windward of the French iflands, ftretching from the latitude of Defeada to that of St. Vincent, with a line of frigates fill farther to windward; thus covering the course from Europe in fuch a manner, that it was thought impoffible for any number of fhips in company to avoid being entangled in the barrier. The French convoy had, however, the addrefs, by making the ifland of Defeada to the northward, getting to leeward of our fleet, and creeping clofe in under the land of Guadaloupe and DoMarch 20th. minique, to escape the danger, and to arrive fafe in Fort-Royal Bay, where they found the Count de Graffe bufy in repairing his fhips, and brought him the means of fpeedily equipping his fleet for the new intended fervice. This unlooked-for disappointment was a fevere check to the hopes of the British admiral, and left him nothing farther for the prefent to do than to return to Gros Inlet Bay, in St. Lucia, there to refit his fhips, to take in fuch a fupply of water, ftores, and provifions, as would qualify the fleet for long fervice, and to keep a ftrict watch, by the means of his frigates, upon the preparation and movements of the enemy in Fort-Royal Bay; taking care, above all things, to be ready to put to fea at the instant that he fhould receive notice of their making a fimilar difpofition. The objects of the hoftile commanders were not lefs oppofite than their interefts. It was the business and defign of the Count de Graffe to avoid fighting by all poffible means, until he had formed a junction with the French and Spanish fleets at Hilpaniola; when their combined force would have been fo vaftly fuperior, as to forbid every attempt on the fide of England by fea, to obstruct their defigns during the campaign. Oa the other fide, the falvation of the West Indies, with the whole fortune and hope of the war, de. pended upon the British commanders preventing the junction, or at least their bringing on a clofe and decifive engagement with the Count de Graffe before it took place. Such were the ftakes depending upon a shift of wind, upon other the most usual cafualties of weather, and upon the numerous accidents and difappointments to which all naval movements and operations are peculiarly liable. Nothing could be more perilously critical. The British fleet at St. Lucia amounted to 36 ships of the line. The force under M. de Graffe at Martinique, only to 34. We except from the latter account, 2 fhips of the line armed en flute, and 2 fifty-fours; the former not being in either engagement, and the laft, if present, acting only as frigates. The accounts vary greatly as to the number actually engaged. We here adhere to the written order for the line of battle, figned by M. de Graffe himself, and which feems confirmed upon an estimate of the general teftimony. The French feet feems to have been rather over-manned (though if it be an error, it is a general and national one); and besides a full complement of feamen, had near 6,000 land-forces on board. The Ville de Paris, of 110 guns, De Graffe's own fhip, had not less than 1,300 men, including foldiers, on board; and the French feventy-fours carried 900 men each. Their metal is always heavier than that of the English in equal rates; but feveral of their fhips were only in indifferent condition. The Englifh had five 90 gun fhips, which was their highest rate; and the French had eight of 80 and 84 guns each, befides the Ville de Paris, which was confidered as the pride and bulwark of their fleet. So that upon the whole, if an exact eftimate were made of the force on both fides, oppofing fuperior weight of metal in larger fhips, and a much greater number of men, on the one, to the advantages of better condition, two fhips more in number, and a fomewhat greater number of guns, on the other, the comparative balance would probably be found tolerably even, and it would appear, that contending fleets do not often happen to meet upon more equal terms. The van of the English was commanded by Sir Samuel Hood, the centre by Sir George Rodney, and the rear by Admiral Francis Drake. The hips were in good condition; and perhaps a fet of more brave and able officers were never ioined in the command of an equal number in any conflict. The three divifions of the French fleet were commanded by the Count de Graffe, M. de Vaudrevil, and M. de Bougainville, who were all distinguished commanders. The French fleet began to turn out of the harbour at Fort-Royal by the break of day on the 8th of April, with a great convoy under their protection, all bound to leeward, and intending to fall down to the French or Spanish ports in Hifpaniola. But as M. de Grasse had every reafon for wishing to avoid any encounter on his paflage, inftead of pufhing, as his courfe was directly to leeward, which would have laid him open to the fair and unremitted chace of his purfuers, and which it would have been impoffible to evade in an open fea with fo conftant a wind, he thought it more advifeable to keep clofe in under the islands, until he had eluded the purfuit. The adoption of this courfe feemed to promife many advantages. The French being better acquainted with the coafts, could keep much clofer to the land than the English would dare to adventure, and keeping the convoy between him and the fore, he hoped to throw them off entirely to leeward; the feveral channels between the iflands were likewife better known to the French; and thefe, with the great diverfity of winds and paffages which they afforded, feemed to hold out inexhaustible means of baffling the purfuit of an ene-. mv. His condut, however, in this bufinets bufinefs has been questioned, and The movements of the enemy, and their departure from that bay, were fo fpeedily communicated by fignals from the frigates upon the watch, and the English fleet were in fuch excellent preparation, that the whole were clear of Grofs-Iflet Bay by noon, and purfued them with the utmost expedition; fo that the French gained only a few hours by being mafters of the time of departure. This unequald diligence, and the general ardour, which it might be faid added wings to the fleet, brought them within fight of the enemy under Dominique, on that very night; and they afterwards regulated the purfuit by their fignals. So fudden a preffure could not have been expected by M. de Graffe. He, however, like a prepared and accomplished commander, immediately fuited himself to the emergency, and though fighting was by no means his object, he formed the line of battle to windward betimes in the morning, thereby affording an opportunity to his convoy to proceed on their courfe, whilft he ftood to abide the confequences. On the other fide, Sir George Rodney had thrown out fignals foon after five in the morning to prepare for battle, to form the line at two cable lengths diftance afunder, and for the fhips to fill and ftand on. But the English fleet lay becalmed for a confiderable time under the high lands of Dominique, while the enemy, who were farther advanced towards Guadaloupe, had wind enough to enable them to make the movements we have stated. The breeze at length reached the van of the English fleet, and they began to close with the French center, whilft their own center and rear were ftill becalmed. It is faid that the Count de Graffe might still have avoided an engagement; but the temptation held out of falling with his whole weight upon and entirely crushing one-third of his enemy's force while thus feparated, was too ftrong to be well refifted. The action commenced about nine o'clock. The attack Apr. 9. was was led by the Royal Oak, Captain Burnet, and feconded by the Alfred and the Montague, with the moft impetuous bravery. The whole divifion were in a few minutes closely engaged, and for more than an hour were exceedingly preffed by the great fuperiority of the enemy. The Barfleur, Sir Samuel Hood's own fhip, had at one time feven, and generally three fhips firing upon her; and none of the divifion efcaped the encounter of a very difproportionate force. Nothing could be more glorious than the firm and effective refiftance with which, and without once fhrinking, they fuftained all the efforts of so great a fuperiority. At length, and by degrees, the leading ships of the center were enabled to come up to the affiftance of the van. Thefe were foon followed by Sir George Rodney in the Formidable, with his two feconds the Namur and Duke, all of 90 guns; who made and fupported a moft tremendous fire. The gallantry of a French captain of a 74 gun fhip in the rear, who, oppofite to Prince Rupert's Bay, having backed his main-top-fail, fteadily received and bravely returned the fire of these three great fhips in fucceffion without in the leaft flinching from his ftation, excited the higheft applause and admiration of his enemies; and one of our officers could not refrain, under the immediate impulse of his enthufiafm, from calling him 66 a Godlike Frenchman,' " in a letter which he wrote home upon the occafion. The coming up of the admiral with a part of the centre divifion, rendered the fight less unequal; and M. de Graffe, notwithstanding his ftill great fuperiority, finding that his purpofe had failed while the van was engaged fingly, determined, by changing the nature of the action, to prevent its now becoming decifive. The command of the wind, and the connected state of his fleet, enabled him to execute this defign, and to keep fuch a cautious distance during the remainder of the engagement, as was evidently intended to disable our fhips as much as it could be done, without any confiderable hazard on his own fide. This fort of firing, which was extremely well fupported on both fides, and produced as much effect as the distance would admit, was continued for an hour and three quarters longer; during all which time, the reft of the fleet was held back by the calmns and baffling winds under Dominique. Several of our officers have condemned the failure of the enterprize which appeared on the fide of the enemy, in not exerting their fuperiority with greater effect during this interval; but it is poffible that the motives which operated with the French commander did not come within their confideration. The mortification of the fixteen brave officers who commanded the fhips in the rear, and who were doomed to be the ipectators of fo unequal a combat, without having it in their power to fupport their admiral and fellows, is much more easily to be conceived than defcribed. About twelve o'clock the remaining fhips of the center came up, and the rear was clofing the line, upon which M. de Graffe withdrew his fleet from the action, and evaded all the efforts of the English English commanders for its renewal. No fea-battle could be better fought than this was on both fides, fo far at leaft as it fuited the views of the commander on one fide to admit of clofe action; nor has a more tremendous cannonade been known between anv equal number of fhips. The French commander, notwithstanding his great fuperiority at all times, but particularly in his first action with the van, failed entirely in his object; and his fhips received much more damage than their fire produced on the other fide. Two of them were so much difabled, that they were obliged to quit the feet and put into Guadaloupe, by which his line was reduced to thirty-two fhips; and the damage fuftained by others led to the fubfequent action, and to all its decifive confequences. On our fide, the Royal Oak and Montague fuffered extremely; but were ftill capable of being fo far repaired at fea, as not to be under a neceffity of quitting the fleet. Captain Bayne of the Alfred, gallantly fell in this action. The fleet lay to on the night of the 9th to repair their damages; and the following day was principally spent in refitting, in keeping the wind, and in tranfpofing the rear and the van, the former of which not having been in the late action, was neceffarily fitter for the active fervice of that divifion. Both fleets kept turning up to windward in the channel which feparates the islands of Dominique and Guadaloupe. It was conftantly in the power of the enemy to come to action whenever they pleafed, as they were always to windward; while it was impoffible for the English admiral to force them, entangled as his fleet was between thofe iflands and a little cluster of fmall ones, called the Saints, with the wind against him. On the 11th the enemy had got fo far to windward as to weather Guadaloupe, and had gained fuch a diftance, that the body of their fleet could only be defcried from the maft heads of our center. All hope of being able to come up with them feemed now at an end; and it was faid to have become a question of deliberation on our fide, whether to continue a chace which appeared to be hopeless, or at once to push to leeward, and endeavour to get before them at their rendezvous? In this critical ftate of things, fo highly interefting to both fides, two of the French fhips, which had received damage in the late action, were perceived about noon to fall off confiderably from the reft of their fleet to leeward. This welcome fight immediately produced fignals for a gencral chace from the British admiral, and again renewed, throughout the fleet, the hope of coming up with the enemy. The pursuit was fo vigorous, that the Agamemnon, and fome others of the headinoft of the British line, were coming up fo faft with these fhips, that they would have been affuredly cut off before evening, if their fignals for affiftance and evident danger had not induced M. de Graffe to bear down with his whole fleet to their assistance. This fpirited movement brought things precifely to that fituation which our commanders had fo ardently fought, and fo little ex pected. |