"a foot. Thus too ought we to conceive "with regard to ourselves. What are you ?1 "A man. If you consider yourself as some

thing separated and detached, it is agree"able to your nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be in health. But if you con"fider yourself as a man, and as a part of a "whole, upon account of that whole it will "behoove you sometimes to be in sickness, "fometimes to be exposed to the inconveniency of a sea voyage, sometimes to be in "want; and at last, perhaps, to die before your time. Why then do you complain? "Don't you know that by doing so, as the "foot ceases to be a foot, so you cease to be a man * "

66

1

This submission to the order of the universe, this entire indifference with regard to whatever concerns ourselves, when put into the balance with the interest of the whole, could derive its propriety, it is evident, from no other principle besides that upon which I have endeavoured to show that the propriety of justice was founded. As long as we view our own interests with our own eyes, it is scarce possible that we should willingly acquiesce in their being thus sacrificed to the interests of the whole. It is only when we view those opposite interests with the eyes of others that what concerns ourselves can appear to be so contemptible in the comparison, as

Arrian. lib. 2. c. 5.

to

Part VI to be resigned without any reluctance. To every body but the person principally concerned nothing can appear more agreeable to reason and propriety than that the part should give place to the whole. But what is agreeable to the reason of all other men, ought not to appear contrary to his. He himself therefore ought to approve of this sacrifice, and acknowledge its conformity to reason. But all the affections of a wife man, according to the stoics, are perfectly agreeable to reason and propriety, and of their own accord coincide with whatever these ruling principles prescribe. A wise man, therefore, could never feel any reluctance to comply with this disposition of things.

IV. Besides these antient, there are some modern systems, according to which virtue consists in propriety; or in the suitableness of the affection from which we act to the cause or object which excites it. The system of Dr. Clarke, which places virtue in acting according to the relations of things, in regulating our conduct according to the fitness or incongruity which there may be in the application of certain actions to certain things, or to certain relations: That of Mr. Woollaston, which places it in acting according to the truth of things, according to their proper nature and essence, or in treating them as what they really are, and not as what they are not that

of

my lord Shastesbury, which places it in maintaining a proper balance of the affections,

and

and in allowing no passion to go beyond its proper sphere; are all of them more or less inaccurate descriptions of the same fundamental idea.

The description of virtue which is either given, or at least meant and intended to be given in each of those systems, for some of the modern authors are not very fortunate in their manner of expressing themselves, is no doubt quite just, so far as it goes. There is no virtue without propriety, and wherever there is propriety, some degree of approbation is due. But still this description is imperfect. For though propriety is an essential ingredient in every virtuous action, it is not always the sole ingredient. Beneficent actions have in them another quality by which they appear not only to deserve approbation but recompence. None of those systems account either easily or sufficiently for that superior degree of esteem which seems due to such actions, or for that diversity of sentiment which they naturally excite. Neither is the description of vice more compleat. For in the same manner, though impropriety is a necessary ingredient in every vitious action, it is not always the sole ingredient, and there is often the highest degree of absurdity and impropriety in very harmless and insignificant actions. Deliberate actions, of a pernicious tendency to those we live with, have, besides their impropriety, a peculiar quality of their own by which they appear to deserve, not only disapprobation,

but

but punishment; and to be the objects, not of dislike merely, but of resentment and revenge and none of those systems easily and sufficiently account for that superior degree of detestation which we feel for such actions.

CHA P. II.

Of those systems which make virtue consist in prudence.

TH

HE most antient of those systems which make virtue consist in prudence, and of which any considerable remains have come down to us, is that of Epicurus, who is said, however, to have borrowed all the leading principles of his philosophy from some of those who had gone before him, particularly from Aristippus; though it is very probable, notwithstanding this allegation of his enemies, that at least his manner of applying those principles was altogether his own.

*

According to Epicurus bodily pleasure and pain were the sole ultimate objects of natural desire and aversion. That they were always the natural objects of those passions, he thought required no proof. Pleasure might, indeed, appear sometimes to be avoided; not, however, because it was pleasure, but because, by the enjoyment of it, we should

* See Cicero de finibus, lib. i. Diogenes Laerat. I. x.

either forfeit some greater pleasure, or expose ourselves to some pain that was more to be avoided than this pleasure was to be desired. Pain, in the same manner, might appear sometimes to be eligible; not, however, because it was pain, but because by enduring it we might either avoid a still greater pain, or acquire some pleasure of much more impor-tance. That bodily pain and pleasure, therefore, were always the natural objects of de-fire and aversion, was, he thought, abundantly evident. Nor was it less so, he imagined, that they were the sole ultimate objects of those passions. Whatever else was either desired or avoided was so, according to him, upon account of its tendency to produce one or other of those sensations. The tendency to procure pleasure rendered power and riches desirable, as the contrary tendency to produce pain made poverty and infignificancy the objects of aversion. Honour and reputation were valued, because the efteem and love of those we live with were of the greatest consequence both to procure pleafure and to defend us from pain. Ignominy and bad fame, on the contrary, were to be avoided, because the hatred, contempt and resentment of those we lived with destroyed all security, and necessarily exposed us to the greatest bodily evils.

All the pleasures and pains of the mind were, according to Epicurus, ultimately derived from those of the body. The mind

was